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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal theorists in the United States should pay more attention
to Jiirgen Habermas. 1 His theory of discourse ethics provides us
with an enriched understanding of the term "normative validity."
Discourse ethics "is concerned .. .with the grounding of norma-
tivity . . .; its central focus is the . . . specification of appropriate
validation procedures."'2 Once participants in political discourse
agree on validation procedures, they are then in a position to
1. Habermas's work on discourse ethics points the way towards a genuine participatory
democracy. See DAVID M. RASMUSSEN, READING HABERMAS (1990); HABERMAS: CRITICAL DE-
BATES 1-11 (John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982); HABERMAS AND MODERNITY 1-8
(Richard J. Bernstein ed., 1985).
Habermas has integrated continental and Anglo-American philosophies to some extent,
and he tries to answer the question: How is mutual understanding among human beings
possible? For an anthology of excerpts taken from Habermas's writings, see JORGEN
HABERMAS ON SOCIETY AND POLITICS: A READER (Steven Seidman ed., 1989); see also JANE
BRAATEN, HABERMAS'S CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY (1991); THOMAS McCARTHY, IDEALS AND
ILLUSIONS: ON RECONSTRUCTION AND DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY
(1991); STEVEN WHITE, THE RECENT WORK OF JORGEN HABERMAS (1988). Rasmussen's recent
book contains biographical material about Habermas (including bibliographies of his work
and secondary works about his writing). See RASMUSSEN, supra. If I were to label
Habermas's political theory, I would call it "liberal communitarianism." See EZEKIEL J.
EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE 155-177 (1991) (description of liberal
communitarianism).
2. SEYLA BENHABIB & FRED DALLMAYER, THE COMMUNICATIVE ETHICS CONTROVERSY 3
(1990).
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achieve a fully rational consensus3 about normatively right laws
that are in everyone's best interests.4
Habermas maintains that when the validity of a social norm or
law has been questioned,
social actors have three alternatives: they can switch to strategic ac-
tion; they can break off all discussion and go their separate ways; or
they can continue to interact practically by entering into a critical
discussion (practical discourse) about the validity of the norm in
question. A practical discourse aims at a rationally motivated con-
sensus on norms. Discourse ethics articulates the criteria which
guide practical discourses and serve as the standard for distinguish-
ing between legitimate and illegitimate norms. 5
Discourse ethics "must be a fully public communicative process
unconstrained by political or economic force."' 6 When the stringent
conditions of discourse ethics are operative, participants in politi-
cal debate achieve a universalistic7 perspective that takes every
other person's interests equally into account. This attitude solidi-
fies the social bonds linking all people trying to resolve their differ-
ences of opinion cooperatively. Controversies end on a satisfactory
note when the best reasoned argument is admittedly convincing to
everyone. This article compares discourse ethics with bureaucratic
and judicial procedures. The focus is upon rules issued by federal
administrative agencies.
According to Habermasian discourse ethics, the moral burden of
proof is on an agency proposing a gag rule that suppresses morally
relevant information. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court places the
moral burden of persuasion on pregnant women who challenge reg-
3. Habermas does not pit rational analysis and deeply felt emotions against each other. A
fully rational consensus is one in which participants in debate reach political agreement
after reflectively considering whether a proposed norm (procedural or substantive) is norma-
tively right, instrumentally rational and psychologically acceptable. According to discourse
ethics, agreements are based upon the best reasoned argument rather than upon the best
deal a self-interested negotiator can make.
4. See Jtargen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning "Stage
6," 21 PHiL. F. 32, 46-51 (1989-90).
5. Jean Cohen, Discourse Ethics and Civil Society, 14 PHIL. & Soc. CRmcisM 315, 316
(1988).
6. Id.
7. Seyla Benhabib writes that "universalizability is defined as an intersubjective proce-
dure of argumentation geared to attain communicative agreement." Seyla Benhabib, In the
Shadow of Aristotle and Hegel: Communicative Ethics and Current Controversies in Prac-
tical Philosophy, 21 PimL. F. 1, 6 (1989-90).
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ulations that deny them information relevant to their well-being.
Section II examines Rust v. Sullivan,8 which upheld the validity of
an agency rule that destroys the honest relationship between
women and their health care providers.
Section III canvasses the inadequacies of contemporary legal
theory. Because the theories advocated by most American jurists
focus on judicial review, they suffer by comparison to Habermas's
more comprehensive democratic theory.' Section III also discusses
why the paradigm of positivism is inferior to Habermas's discourse
ethics. For the benefit of readers not already familiar with
Habermas's work, Section IV clarifies his jargon, including such
terms as "self-steering systems," the "lifeworld," and "ideal speech
conditions."
Relying primarily on Habermas, the article explains why ordi-
nary citizens need to resist the imperialistic subsystems that colo-
nize society via the media of money and power. These subsystems
include corporate hierarchies, governmental bodies, and the courts.
Rust v. Sullivan is used to illustrate the extent of unchecked bu-
reaucratic power.
Section V reveals that courts, by way of judicial review, are una-
ble to reconstitute administrative law. Section VI proposes several
alternatives to judicial review - alternatives that should
strengthen participatory democracy in the United States.
Most of the American people believe that the agency's gag rule
upheld in Rust violates the bond of trust between government and
the women who ask their subsidized health care providers what
their medically indicated choices are. Rust moves us away from the
liberal ideals of an enlightened democracy that enable individuals
to obtain advice that enables them to re-examine their beliefs and
plans. In short Rust violates the principles of discourse ethics,
which provide a critical vantage point for condemning agency regu-
lations that prevent the public discourse from being fair, honest,
and genuinely open.
8. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
9. Concededly, Habermas's work describing links between law and morality is somewhat
sketchy and needs to be developed more completely and more successfully. See JORGEN
HABERMAS, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LEcTuREs ON HUMAN VALUEs 219 (Sterling
N. McMurrin ed. & Kenneth Baynes trans., 1988).
[Vol. 26:87
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II. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF Rust v. Sullivan
A. Overview of the So-Called Gag Rule Regulations
Rust v. Sullivan'° upheld the facial validity of regulations promul-
gated in 1988 by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the
"Secretary") pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Service
Act."
Under the regulations, a physician discussing family planning mat-
ters with his patient is prohibited in virtually all instances from dis-
cussing abortion. For example, if a woman at a Title X clinic asks
her physician for information about abortion, the physician, in most
circumstances cannot tell the woman anything other than that the
clinic does not believe in abortion [as a method of family planning]
and therefore does not talk about ft.12
Furthermore, "the physician is required to make referrals from a
censored referral list."' 3 Although women currently have a consti-
tutionally recognized abortion option,' 4 Title X physicians are re-
quired to withhold this information.
"Family planning," as used in the regulations, refers to the "pro-
cess of establishing objectives for the number and spacing of one's
children and selecting the means by which those objectives may be
achieved."' 5 The regulations "pose a choice to family planning
clinics: Either take the federal funding and do not discuss abortion
(as a method of family planning), or discuss abortion (as a method
of family planning) but forfeit federal funding."'" Although the rel-
evant details of the regulations are reproduced in the appendix to
this article, "[t]he bottom line is that a practitioner in a Title X-
funded clinic is prevented from saying anything to a pregnant wo-
10. 111 S. Ct. at 1759. This article refers only to Rust; however, my commentary and the
Court's holding and opinion apply as well to the companion case of New York v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
11. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
572, 84 Stat. 1508 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300 a-b (1982)).
12. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1477 (D. Colo. 1988),
aff'd sub nom., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.
1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
13. Id. at 1476.
14. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1990).
16. See Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning Gag Rule; Can the Gov-
ernment Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REv. 401, 402 (1989).
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man about abortion, even if she asks."'17 Moreover, to reduce the
incidence of abortion' s as a method of family planning, the regula-
tions among other things prohibit referrals, lobbying, and advocacy
of any activities that promote abortion.19
The Secretary's regulations were challenged as ultra vires20 and
as incompatible with the First and Fifth Amendments of the Con-
stitution.21 Both the First and the Tenth Circuits invalidated the
challenged regulations, primarily on constitutional grounds.22 The
Second Circuit upheld the regulations.23 In Rust, the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit.24
The Court was unconvinced that constitutional rights of feder-
ally funded grantees were violated even though the regulations
mandated medical deceit and required physicians to betray their
patients. The Court skillfully distinguished between conditions im-
posed on subsidy recipients and conditions placed on programs
and held that the challenged regulations applied to programs.25
Moreover, the Court viewed the federal subsidy as a "carrot"
rather than a "stick," even though many pregnant women are
duped by the funded grantees who grab the carrots.
B. A Closer Look at the Content and Context of the Regulations
1. Historical Background of Title X Regulations
Title X, entitled "Family Planning Services and Population Re-
search Act of 1970, 126 provides federal funding for a broad range of
17. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1474 (D. Colo. 1988),
aff'd sub noma., Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.
1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
18. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1990).
19. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1765 (1991).
20. Id. at 1766. Rust presented the threshold question of whether Congress authorized the
Secretary to deny funds to family planning entities that failed to comply with the new 1988
restrictions. If the Court had held that the Secretary's interference with communicative ac-
tivity was unauthorized, then the Court's resolution of the First and Fifth Amendment is-
sues would not have been necessary.
21. Id. at 1766.
22. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1990);
Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990)(en
banc), vacated sub. nom. Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
23. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom., Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
24. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1764.
25. Id. at 1774-75.
26. Pub. L. No. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1504 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-
[Vol. 26:87
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voluntary family planning methods. The Secretary is authorized
to make grants s to nonprofit entities who establish and operate
family planning projects. Title X also authorizes the Secretary to
issue regulations to make family planning methods more readily
available to persons desiring such information.29
In fiscal year 1988, Title X "provided $142.5 million for family
planning services and related activities."30 The majority of Title X
grantees are public health clinics.3' "Title X projects serve an esti-
mated 14.5 million women. About a third of those who receive ser-
vices are adolescents and approximately ninety percent of the
women served had incomes [substantially] below . . . the poverty
line."32 As of 1989, the money appropriated under Title X pro-
vided services for 4.3 million people. The targeted population for
Title X includes "5 million adolescents between the ages of 15 and
19, and 9.5 million adult women between the ages of 20 and 44.33
Many of the women requesting services suspect that they are preg-
nant, and "are indeed found to be pregnant.
34
Although the Secretary has the power to promulgate rules,3" Ti-
tle X includes the following restriction on the Secretary's regula-
tory power:
Sec. 1008. None of the funds appropriated under this subchapter
300a-6 (1988)).
27. The preamble to the Act states that it was enacted "[t]o promote public health and
welfare by expanding, improving, and better coordinating the family planning services and
population research activities of the Federal Government, and for other purposes." Id. The
declaration of congressional purposes states that the purpose of the Act is "(1) to assist in
making comprehensive voluntary family planning services readily available to all persons
desiring such services; ... [and] ... (5) to develop and make readily available information
(including educational materials) on family planning and population growth to all persons
desiring such information." Id.
28. Title X of the Public Health Service Act authorizes federal grants to public, and non-
profit private entities. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1988).
29. See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
572, § 1005, 84 Stat. 1504, 1507 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-3 (1988)).
30. Note, supra note 7, at 408.
31. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 55
(1st Cir. 1990)(en banc), vacated sub. nom., Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 2252
(1991)).
32. Id. at 56 (citing 131 CONG. REC. S16,860 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1985)).
33. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 415 n.1 (2d. Cir. 1989), aff'd sub nom., Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
34. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-4(a) (1988).
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shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family
planning.36
The Secretary's original interpretation of section 1008 permitted
recipients of Title X funds "to provide neutral information to
women regarding abortion in a counseling context, as long as the
activity 'did not have the immediate effect of promoting abortion
or . . .the principal purpose or effect . . of promoting abortion
... C,,"s In 1978, the regulations clearly provided that " 'the pro-
vision of information concerning abortion services [and] mere re-
ferral of an individual to another provider of services for an abor-
tion . . . are not considered to be proscribed by § 1008.' "
By 1981, Program Guidelines issued by the Department of
Health and Human Services specifically required nondirective
counseling for pregnant women .3 The regulations promulgated by
the Secretary in 1986 "prohibited grant recipients from performing
abortions but did not purport to censor or mandate any kind of
speech."4 0 In sum, the Secretary's interpretations prior to 1988
permitted nondirective options counseling so long as grantees did
not actively encourage or promote abortion as a method of family
planning.
2. The New Regulations
On September 1, 1987, the Secretary, under a directive from
President Reagan, proposed new regulations setting forth more
specific standards for compliance with section 1008.41 The new reg-
ulations distinguish between Title X programs and non-funded
programs. 42 For example, under the new regulations an organiza-
tion may no longer receive Title X funds to operate an abortion
36. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, §
1008, 84 Stat. 1504, 1508 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)).
37. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bowen, 680 F. Supp. 1465, 1470 (D. Colo. 1988),
aff'd sub noma. Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1490 (10th Cir. 1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991) (quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 2923 (1988)).
38. Id. at 1470 (quoting Letter from Office of General Counsel, Health, Education, and
Welfare, to Elsie Sullivan, Assistant for Information and Education, Office for Family Plan-
ning (Apr. 1, 1978)); see also Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 1990),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
39. Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d at 62.
40. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1787-8 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42
C.F.R. §§ 59.1-59.13 (1986)).
41. See 52 Fed. Reg. 33,210-15 (1987).
42. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-46 (1988).
[Vol. 26:87
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clinic in physical structures funded by the federal government.43
The new regulations also provide that a "project" 44 may not re-
ceive federal funds unless it is in compliance with the following
rules dealing with abortion as a method of family planning:
(1) Title X Projects may not provide options counselling or
referrals.4"
Courts have held that the prohibitions of referrals and counsel-
ling are not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.
46
(2) A pregnant client must be furnished with a list of health
care providers who "promote the welfare of [the] mother and
[the] unborn child." The list is incomplete because it is censored.
Until the pregnant woman keeps an appointment with one of
these governmentally approved health care providers, she must be
furnished with prenatal care information necessary to protect the
health of the unborn child.41
This ban opens the door for federal budget-cutters who formu-
late policies of "cost-containment the sleazy way, by forcing doc-
tors to mislead their federally insured patients about the ...
availability of treatments the government prefers not to fund. ' 48
(3) Client referrals may not be used "as an indirect means of
encouraging or promoting abortion as a method of family plan-
ning. '49 Accordingly, Title X projects may not provide lists of
"health care providers whose principal business is the provision
of abortions."50 More specifically, Title X projects may not steer
43. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766. The Secretary's position, until the new regulations were
promulgated, was that so long as federal funds were kept separate, physical separation of
the abortion program from the Title X program was unnecessary. Massachusetts v. Bowen,
679 F. Supp. 137, 143 n.2 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899
F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated sub nom., Sullivan v. Massachusetts, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991)
(citing Memorandum from Joel M. Mangel, Office of General Counsel, Health, Education,
and Welfare, to Louis M. Hellman, M.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs
(Apr. 20, 1971)).
44. "Title X program" and "Title X project" are used interchangeably in the amended
regulations to "mean the identified program which is approved by the Secretary for support
under ... the Act ... ." 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1988).
45. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1).
46. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991); Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d
53, 61 (1st Cir. 1990).
47. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2).
48. M. Gregg Bloche, Mandating Medical Deceit, WASH. PosT, July 9, 1991, at A19.
49. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(3).
50. Id.
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clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family
planning."
This content-based regulation, which sharply deviates from the
Secretary's more tolerant 1980 Program Guidelines,52 interferes
with communicative interaction between patients and their
physicians.
(4) Projects providing clients with information concerning con-
traceptive information may not "include counseling with respect
to . . .abortion as a method of family planning. '5 3
This content-based regulation insensitively divides many physi-
cian-patient relationships into pre-conception and post-conception
segments.
(5) Title X projects may not use federal funds to engage in the
following forbidden activities:
a. Lobbying for legislation increasing the availability of abor-
tion planning;
b. Providing speakers who promote the use of abortion as a
family planning method;
c. "Paying dues to any group that, as a significant part of its
activities, advocates abortion as a method of family planning;"
d. Using legal action to make abortion more readily available;
e. Developing or disseminating any information which advo-
cates abortion; for example, grantees may not give patients
"brochures advertising an abortion clinic. '54
Although a Title X "recipient remains free to use private, non-
Title X funds to finance abortion-related activities, 55 the Secre-
tary's speech-restrictive regulations impinge on First Amendment
freedoms.
(6) A project may not use Title X funds unless it is physically
51. Id.
52. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS
FOR FAMILY PLANNING SEVICES (1981).
53. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(4).
54. 42 C.F.R. § 59.109(a), (b).
55. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 n.5 (1991). Apparently, matching funds pro-
vided by state and local governments may not be used for the activities prohibited by the
regulation.
[Vol. 26:87
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and financially separated from facilities5 where prohibited activ-
ities occur.57
The requisite extent of this separation is determined on a case-
by-case basis."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that the requirement of physical separation runs contrary to Con-
gress's emphasis on coordinated and integrated health care ser-
vices.59 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also criticized
the financial and physical separation requirement 0 because it un-
reasonably restricts a grantee's ability to provide private abortion
counseling.6' The Supreme Court, however, accepted the Secre-
tary's explanation that the facility-separation requirements are
necessary to assure that Title X grantees "avoid creating the ap-
pearance that the government is supporting abortion-related activ-
ities. 61 2 The Court also held "that the program integrity require-
ments are . . . not inconsistent with Congressional intent."'6 3
In summary, the Secretary's interpretations of Title X initially
permitted and later required grant recipients to provide some in-
formation about abortions.6 4 Indeed, if a woman desiring an abor-
tion requested a referral (in 1981), then grant recipients were re-
quired to help her find physicians who performed abortions in
non-funded agencies.6 5 As late as 1986, the regulations contained
56. Facilities include treatment, consultation, examination, and waiting rooms.
57. Id.
58. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9.
59. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1498 (10th Cir.
1990).
60. Programs that receive partial Title X funding are required under the regulations to
restructure their facilities so that federally funded activities are "physically and financially
separate" from any prohibited activities. 42 C.F.R. § 59.9.
61. Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 74 (1st. Cir. 1990).
62. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1769 (1991).
63. Id. at 1770.
64. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 405 (2d Cir. 1989). A memorandum from the
General Counsel for the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare advised the Secre-
tary in 1978 that "provision of information concerning abortion services [and] mere referral
of an individual to another provider of services for an abortion ... are not considered to be
proscribed by § 1008." Id. (quoting memorandum from Joel M. Mangel, Office of General
Counsel, Health, Education, and Welfare, to Louis M. Hellman, M.D., Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Population Affairs (Apr. 20, 1971)). The memorandum suggested that "[i]f the
immediate effect of the activity is essentially neutral as in the case of mere referral or collec-
tion of statistical data, then the activity does not fall afoul of § 1008." Id. However, non-
neutral activities such as encouraging or otherwise assisting a woman in obtaining an abor-
tion would clearly violate § 1008. Id.
65. See id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, Program Incentives for Pro-
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no restrictions censoring or mandating speech.6
An entirely new approach was embodied in the 1988 regulations.
The 1988 regulations fall into three categories; (i) counseling and
referrals (ii) lobbying and advocacy, and (iii) physical and financial
separation of Title X programs and abortion programs. As to the
first category, if a pregnant woman asks about abortion providers,
then the federally funded project counselor may not "encourag[e]
or promot[e] abortion as a method of family planning. '67 The 1988
regulations in the second category prohibit the exercise of First
Amendment rights by grantees who desire to influence government
officials. Concerning the third category, the high cost of complying
with the physical separation requirement eliminates many two-
track family counseling programs. In short, the 1988 regulations
curtail, censor, and mandate speech in accordance with the federal
government's anti-abortion policy.
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF LEGAL THEORY
A. The Impotence of Legal Scholarship
People need law to liberate them from overt and hidden forms of
tyranny. There is also a related need for persons to become aware
of their options and best interests by engaging in ongoing, un-
coerced, non-manipulative communicative action with government
officials. Habermas's discourse ethics protects everyone from un-
constitutional conditions abridging speech more so than the follow-
ing approaches to law.
1. The Critical Legal Studies Movement
In 1975, a disturbing critique of the antinomies" and aporias of
classical liberalism's presuppositions inspired a movement. 9 Thus
ject Grants for Family Planning Services (Jan. 1976); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES § 8.6
(1981)).
66. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 C.F.R.
§§ 59.1-.13 (1986)).
67. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(3).
68. According to Roberto Unger, adjudication based on classical liberal thought requires
judgments of instrumental rationality; and yet, according to liberal thought, adjudication is
inconsistent with instrumental rationality. See ROBERTO M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS
138 (1975).
69. For a description of the critical legal studies movement, see MARK KELMAN, A GUME
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
[Vol. 26:87
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far, the critical legal studies movement has not produced a consen-
sus-building model useful for rationally transforming the structure
of law.70 By discrediting law as a rational enterprise, critical schol-
ars undercut their own credibility when they rely on reasoning to
argue for legal reforms.
Mainstream lawyers and judges believe that the critical legal
scholars and their predecessors, the legal realists, are wrong in
thinking that rules are necessarily arbitrary and that legal doc-
trines are a sham.7 1 Destabilizing critical legal theory is generally
regarded as dogmatic and radical by mainstream moderates. More-
over, critical legal theory is antithetical to democratic discourse
ethics because most critical scholars insist that they know which
principles of justice are best for society.
2. The Law and Economics Approach
Some academically influential scholars have integrated economic
principles with theories of adjudication. Laissez-faire-minded
economists believe that market forces should constrain lawmakers
even though legal regulation, according to centrist and left-wing
economists, is often necessary to prevent socially undesirable free-
market outcomes. 7 2 Professor, now Judge, Richard A. Posner 7' has
shown how we may explain much of the common law through the
use of economic principles. Judges are in a position to adopt objec-
tive criteria (e.g., Pareto or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency tests) when
choosing among proposed case rulings. Nevertheless, in cases re-
70. Objectives as vague as Roberto Unger's vision of a world "free from deprivation and
drudgery" do not help decide concrete cases. See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Studies
Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 651 (1983). Unger himself wrote that a "newly established
theory throws a strong light on the connection among the principles that govern the several
branches of knowledge ..... But the emerging system of thought no sooner becomes a
dominant one than it begins to fall into pieces that can no longer be put back together."
UNGER, supra note 68, at 1.
71. See Charles Fried, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
331, 333 (1988).
72. For example, legal regulation can be used to prevent grossly unequal distributions of
wealth and income.
73. Judge Posner concedes that expertise in economics does not frequently help judges
agree on a method of interpreting certain texts such as judicial opinions, statutes, and con-
stitutions. See Richard Posner, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 326, 329 (1988). For Judge Posner's works on law and economics, see ECONOMIC ANALY-
SiS OF LAW (1986) and THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). Posner recognizes that the subject
of economics is markets rather than the legal system, and that it is a mistake to think that
criteria useful to economists are often useful in cases involving fundamental or unenumer-
ated constitutional rights. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 362 (1990).
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quiring an interpretation of the Constitution the notion that utility
or efficiency is a desirable consideration is but one preference
among many competing standards of adjudication. Therefore, in
cases presenting questions of constitutional law, the objectivity
claim of law and economics theorists in the "Chicago school" is
misleading.
In the nineteenth century, Max Weber criticized the type of
pragmatic thinking that is celebrated by the Chicago school.74
Weber believed that a one dimensional conception of instrumental
rationality inadequately measures the moral costs of pursuing
greater wealth. Similarly, law-related economic theory is not ade-
quately sensitive to humanistic considerations of decency, fairness,
and kindness. Unlike Jtirgen Habermas, many jurists who believe
that wealth maximization is the law's objective doubt the existence
and relevance of identifiable, testable and falsifiable moral norms.
3. Process-Oriented Theory
John Hart Ely's process-oriented theory reinforces liberal de-
mocracy; its proposals protect politically weak groups who do not
have adequate opportunities to influence lawmakers.7 5 Unfortu-
nately, however, the type of judicial review deemed adequate by
Ely is incapable of invalidating morally unjustifiable laws. Ely's
theory of judicial review is not supplemented by a critical theory
with power to overcome many hidden forms of domination latent
in majoritian rule.
The process-oriented theory of communicative action conceived
by Jtirgen Habermas is deeper, broader and more emancipatory
than Ely's theory of democracy. Habermas's theory appeals to a
concept of reciprocal respect that motivates citizens not to treat
their political opponents as mere objects of their will. For
Habermas, the unreflective will of the majority is not an adequate
test of a law's validity.
Habermas's vision of a rational democratic society is a "commu-
74. Weber ambivalently described social pathologies associated with the complex of ten-
dencies related to scientific and technical progress and its extension to areas of society sub-
ject to the criteria of instrumentally rational decisions. Weber regarded the modem develop-
ment of economic activity, law, and the expanding bureaucracy as a "'shell of bondage.'"
THOMAS McCARTHY, THE CarricAL THEORY OF JORGEN HABERMAS 8-19 (1978).
75. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DisTRUs.a A THEORY OF JuDiciAL REVIEW (1980). Ely
stresses the importance of those participational rights that justified several landmark War-
ren Court decisions.
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nication community of . . . participants in a practical discourse
[who] test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they
accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given
circumstances the proposed norms are 'right.' "76 Valid norms are
morally binding because they are the products of a genuine con-
sensus. Like Ely, Habermas's consensus-based theory provides a
process-based justification for validity claims about proposed laws.
Unlike Ely, however, Habermas's theories of adjudication combine
legal reasoning and moral reasoning.
4. Rights-Oriented Jurisprudence
Rights-oriented theories of social justice integrate law with mo-
rality. Most fundamental substantive rights are based upon open-
ended moral concepts (e.g., dignity, autonomy, and equality).
These abstract concepts need to be converted into concrete "wheat
and chaff" segments. But who makes the hard decisions? Rights-
oriented theorists empower judges to provide the best interpreta-
tion of indeterminate rights. Unwilling to accept this responsibil-
ity, the Rehnquist Court in Rust empowers agencies to impose un-
constitutional conditions. Unlike Habermas, the rights-oriented
legal theorists do not rely primarily upon participatory dialogues
leading to a rationally-motivated consensus.
5. Communitarianism
Some political theorists are trying to inspire an interest in com-
munitarian principles and aspirations." Communitarians cogently
describe the disadvantages of a fragmented, pluralistic society.
They have revived civic republicanism and civic virtue,7s and they
condemn classical liberalism's fixation on the egocentric individual.
Communitarians reject political neutrality and believe that the law
76. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS 105 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1976).
77. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LMERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). But see NANCY
L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIERALISM 152-163 (1987).
78. See, e.g., Frank i Michelnan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term: Foreward: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986). Communitarianism tends to suffocate individ-
uality and spontaneous self-expression. Communitarians have the "idea that we are not in
any meaningful sense... unconnected individuals, but are interdependent and inevitably
connected to one another,. . . and that even our personal identity and meaning depend on
our connections as members of a community." Gary Peller, The Classical Theory of Law, 73
CORNELL L. Rnv. 300, 304 (1988). Communitarians insist that the good is prior to the right in
the political realm. Justice is therefore subordinated to the community's conception of the
good life. CHARLES E. LARMoRE, PATTERNS OF MORAL CobMLExiTY 123 (1987).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
should embody and foster some particular conception of the com-
mon good. But one community's ethos is politically incorrect in an-
other community. Moreover, in the United States, most of us have
allegiances to, and shifting involvements with, many communities.
Communitarianism is perhaps appropriate for small, homoge-
nous, and stable communities, but mandatory social solidarity is
unrealistic in large pluralistic nations where many groups do not
share the same core beliefs, values, and social and moral perspec-
tive. Unfortunately, legal theorists advocating all-consuming com-
munitarianism have failed to devise methods to prevent the rise of
irrational nationalism, exclusionary ethnocentricism and arrogant
ideological parochialism.
6. The Law and Literature Movement
The once fashionable law and literature movement is an exciting
but unpredictable ideologiekritik.7 9 By analyzing novels and the
great classics of literature, a story of law untold in the official re-
ports of cases can be reconstructed. Indeed, discerning authors of
immortalized literary works help lawyers (whose vision is narrowed
by the case method) see the full dimensions of injustices not recti-
fied by the legal system. The connection between law and rhetoric
is another reason for a law and literature synthesis, but "[e]ven the
meaning and significance of rhetoric seems to involve a rhetorical
dispute."80 Although literary critics explain why the distinction be-
tween justice and injustice is often a matter of ideology and inter-
pretation, literary hermeneutics generates new controversies about
the art of interpretation. Some writers believe that most words
mean whatever they want them to mean. Unfortunately, many of
these influential writers privilege ideological purity over enlight-
ened liberal values.8 1
79. Deconstruction, for example, is a view about language and texts that creates the pros-
pect of endless indeterminacy. Deconstruction, needless to say, has had no impact on the
law although its critique of logocentricism is provocative; the problem is that deconstruc-
tionists do not fully explain what they mean by logocentricism because that would be too
logocentric. For a clear description of what deconstructionists probably mean by logocentr-
ism, see J. CLAUDE EvANs, STRATEGIES OF DECONSTUCTION 146-55 (1991).
80. Brook Thomas, Reflections on the Law and Literature Revival, 17 CRrricAL INQUIRY
510, 523 (1991).
81. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF SPiRm. HEIDEGGER AND THE QUEsTION 34 (Geoffrey Benning-
ton & Rachael Bowlby trans., 1989). Another movement, feminist juris prudence, is not dis-
cussed in this article. It is a fragmented movement that has much to offer, but thus far, the
law has been unreceptive to its more radical tenets which are incompatible with liberalism.
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7. Do Theories Have Consequences?
None of the aforementioned theories have transformed the na-
ture of the judicial process or the practice of law. Some critics of
the theory-building project claim that no theory, however brilliant,
comprehensive, and profound, can change the practices of lawyers
and judges. 2 Stanley Fish contends that we ought to abandon the
hope that theory has practical consequences.8 3 He contends:
(1) that in whatever form it appears the argument for theory fails,
(2) that theory is not and could not be used to ... generate and/
or guide practice,
(3) that when theory is in fact "used" it is . . . in order "retro-
spectively" to justify a decision reached on other grounds,
(4) that theory is essentially a rhetorical and political phenome-
non whose effects are purely contingent, and
(5) that these truths are the occasion neither of cynicism nor of
despair.8 4
If Fish simply means that theory remains ineffectual until it is
put into practice, his claim is sound, but sterile. If he means that
no "cutting edge" theory has made any difference in the way peo-
ple behave (after it becomes known and approved by enough peo-
ple to change their world view), his claim is absurd. The theorie's of
Martin Luther, Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, John Locke, and
Jeremy Bentham, among others, disprove that assertion. When
judges are convinced that one of several competing theories of ad-
judication is the best theory, their adoption of the "best" theory
can transform the Constitution. Although, socially-accepted theo-
ries usually become indistinguishable from practices,8 5 few, if any,
theories of justice during the last 150 years have injected any be-
neficent code of normative rightness or fraternity 6 into the law. To
82. See, e.g., MNARK TUSHNET, RED, WHrrE, AND BLUE: A CRITIcAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1988).
83. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CoMEs NATURALLY 372-98 (1989).
84. Id. at 380.
85. Law is somewhat less conceptualistic than it was 100 years ago, thanks to the theories
of William James and C.S. Pierce adopted by, among others, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. and other legal realists. The legal realists who exposed the flaws in formal legal
reasoning did not transform the nature of the judicial process.
86. Ronald Dworkin claims that law is "a fraternal attitude, an expression of how we are
united in community though divided in project, interest, and conviction." RONALD DWORKIN,
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the contrary, judges continue to resolve disputes in accordance
with the predictable and stabilizing "process of reasoning that is
replicable by lawyers.""7
Concededly, there have been piecemeal legal reforms inspired by
specialized theories that respond to the apparent incoherence of
the case law.88 These narrowly drawn mini-theories explain how
and why various lines of cases need to be realigned, but they do
not prophetically usher in new paradigms that could radically
change the methods of the legal profession. To achieve radical
change, a theorist must convince a critical mass of the legal profes-
sion, as well as the general public, to abandon their faulty prem-
ises, constellations of belief, and methods.,"
Despite the efforts of American legal theorists, we still have a
negative Constitution; one that does not recognize fundamental
rights such as housing, education, clothing, medicine, food, and
welfare checks. Increased sexual freedom is found in the penum-
bras of rights of privacy, but this development is attributable more
to the counter-culture lionized during the 1960's than to the mono-
logic theories of John Rawls.e0 In short, judges remain unmoved by
supra disciplinary scholarly theories explaining why courts should
act as imaginative novelists or "independent architects"91 who
should creatively enlarge the dimensions of social justice.
Habermas's ideas empower the people to emancipate themselves
from outmoded ideologies, and his theory of discourse ethics pro-
vides the means for their enlightened emancipation.
LAw's EMPIRE 413 (1986).
87. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1988). The legal profes-
sion expects judges to use a method of legal reasoning that lawyers should be able to repli-
cate; otherwise attorneys "could not give reliable legal advice in planning and dispute-settle-
ment." Id. It follows that many proposed moral norms are considered destabilizing,
potentially dysfunctional and therefore legally irrelevant.
88. For example, § 90 of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS was a product of the
efforts of Samuel Williston and Lon Fuller. See EISENBERG, supra note 87, at 78.
89. Bruce Ackerman explains how the New Deal justices appointed by Franklin D.
Roosevelt radically reconstructed the Founder's conceptions of liberty. This led to the legi-
timization of a powerful regulatory and welfare dispensing state. BRUCE AcRaMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 40-49, 103-108, 118-29 (1991).
90. I refer of course to John Rawls' theory of justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
91. DWORKYN, supra note 86, at 410.
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B. A Half-Hearted Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, strictly applied,
never permits the government to grant a benefit on the condition
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right.92 This unpre-
dictable line of cases has many ragged edges. Although the Su-
preme Court has frequently held that unconstitutional conditions
attached to the benefits provided by law are valid,9 3 the Court, in
many cases, has struck down the condition in question. 4 Of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine Richard Epstein writes: "It
roams about constitutional law like Banquo's ghost, invoked in
some cases, but not in others. '9 5 Kathleen Sullivan, like Epstein,
criticizes courts96 that fail to invalidate laws and regulations that
92. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HAV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
93. In South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Secretary of Transportation was
authorized to withhold a portion of the allocated state highway construction funds if states
did not enact laws forbidding the purchase of alcoholic beverages to persons under age
twenty-one. This condition was upheld even though its relevance to the purposes of the
expenditure was questionable.
In Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), and in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1972), the
Court upheld a subsidy for the medical expenses of childbirth, but not abortion, despite the
claim that the selective subsidy interfered with the fundamental right of reproductive au-
tonomy. The Court has also upheld conditions to tax benefits, which require non-profit or-
ganizations to spin off their lobbying activities to separate affiliates. Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), the Court upheld a condition that required
recipients of federal contract grants to set aside a percentage of those grants for designated
minority subcontractors. In Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947), the Court
upheld the applicable statute that conditioned continued employment in state agencies on
the prohibition of participation in political campaigns.
94. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (government may not
condition public broadcasting subsidy on abstinence from editorializing); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residency requirement penalized residents of state seek-
ing welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state cannot deny claimant
unemployment compensation benefit because she chose not to work on Saturday due to her
religious precepts); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (veterans' property.tax exemp-
tion conditioned on fulfillment of loyalty oath requirements was deemed a penalty); United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (subsidy to farmers conditioned on reduction of crop
production deemed coercion by economic pressure); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926) (state's attempt to attach condition to the privilege of using
highways deemed coercive).
95. Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term - Foreword: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARv. L. REv. 4, 10-11 (1988).
96. Sullivan, supra note 92, at 1415. In its most absolutist form, the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions "holds that even if a state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a
privilege or benefit, it cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions, that improperly 'co-
erce,' 'pressure,' or 'induce' the waiver of constitutional rights." Epstein, supra note 95, at 6-
7; see Robert L. Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUm.
L. REv. 321 (1935); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Nega-
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accomplish indirectly what lawmakers are constitutionally forbid-
den to achieve directly.9 7
Professor Sullivan argues that courts should at least require
lawmakers to explain why conditions on government benefits that
'indirectly' burden preferred liberties should not be as invalid as
'direct' burdens on those same rights, such as the threat of crimi-
nal punishment.9 8 She identifies the harmful systemic effects of
unconstitutional conditions (viz., the inappropriate allocation of
relationships between the government and rightholders, the invidi-
ously discriminatory effects on some rightholders, and the perpetu-
ation of an already underprivileged caste).99 She cogently points
out the limitations of existing judicial methods that only ask
whether the challenged condition is (1) penalizing or coercive, 100
(2) the result of governmental extortion, deceptions and manipula-
tions,'' or (3) a denial of basic rights.102
The law's validity is suspect when courts uphold conditions that
burden liberties simply because formally correct procedures were
followed. 0 3 Nevertheless, Professor Sullivan's proposals for stricter
scrutiny of conditions, which pressure indigents to surrender pre-
ferred rights, were ignored by a majority of the Justices in Rust v.
Sullivan.0 4 Thus, once again, a professor's legal theory has failed
to influence the direction of law. Indeed, Professor Sullivan, who
helped write the brief filed by petitioners in Rust, did not even
advocate her own theory.
Professor Sullivan's failure to persuade the Court is unfortunate.
As stated earlier, Rust upholds regulations which induce citizens to
forego the exercise of cherished First Amendment rights, namely
freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of association
and freedom to obtain medically relevant information and counsel-
tive Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1984); Albert J. Rosenthal, Condi-
tional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103 (1987); Note, Uncon-
stitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1595 (1960).
97. Sullivan, supra note 92, at 1413.
98. Id. at 1419.
99. Id. at 1491.
100. Id. at 1428-56.
101. Id. at 1456-76.
102. Id. at 1476-89.
103. By contrast, Habermas observes that legal norms that are not morally justified can-
not be sufficiently legitimized through a positivistic reference to procedures. See 2 JIRGEN
HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: THE CRIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON
364-65 (1981).
104. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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ing. The Court, contrary to the principles of discourse ethics, im-
posed the administration's politically inspired vision of morality on
women whose own judgmental capacity - concerning what repro-
ductive choices are morally right - is deemed untrustworthy.
C. The Paradigms of Positivism and Communicative Action
Compared
1. Positivism and Rust v. Sullivan
The Justices in Rust v. Sullivan did not question the paradigm
of legalistic positivism that restricts their world view. The posi-
tivists believe that factual statements can be ontologically sepa-
rated from non-factual statements or generalizations."' 5 Positivism
is unduly influenced by science, and the validity of science is
deemed independent of any moral principles. Indeed, things and
events in the world are viewed by instrumentally rational scientists
as potentially manipulable objects.
How does a positivist conceptualize law and the legal system? 10 6
For an old-fashioned arch-positivist, laws are the sovereign's com-
mands issued by one or more habitually obeyed persdns who do
not render habitual obedience to anyone.10 7 This Austinian defini-.
tion is now discredited. Contemporary positivists now explain that
general commands (e.g., legislation) become binding if, but only if,
the community (including judges authorized to discern the law) ac-
cepts the commands as authoritative and recognizes them as valid
merely because they have been duly enacted according to existing
procedures and rules.108
Under a regime of positivism, judges should not evaluate laws
according to universally valid norms of morality. Although the Sec-
retary's gag rule can easily be validated in a regime of positivism, it
is clearly incompatible with the principles of discourse ethics. Con-
105. 2 JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THEoRETIcAL LOGIC IN SOCIOLOGY. Tim ANTINOAIES OF
CLASSICAL THOUGHt. MARX AN DuRKHEIM xviii (1982).
106. Positivism is a term first used by Henri, comte de Saint-Simon, to refer to the scien-
tific method and its extension to philosophy. It refers to a major philosophical movement
which became dominant in Western thought during the last half of the 19th century. It
draws support from the works of Francis Bacon, English empiricists and other Enlighten-
ment philosophes. The apparent scientific successes of the industrial revolution created the
hope that scientific methods could be successfully employed in ethics, religion, politics, and
law. 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 414 (1967).
107. JOSEPH RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 5 (2d ed. 1980).
108. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHL L. REV. 14, 17-46 (1967).
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trary to positivism, Jfirgen Habermas's theory stipulates the condi-
tions for reaching agreements about verifiable universally valid
moral principles. Habermas's theory undermines the validity of
any law that is not generated by procedures likely to produce a
reflective and fully rational moral consensus.
2. Discourse Ethics
Discourse ethics rejects the reductive paradigm of instrumen-
tally rational positivism. It is the antithesis of a rational choice
model in which an orientation of self-interest takes precedence
over social norms advancing the common good. The concept of dis-
course ethics is expansive enough to include moral reasoning.
When a norm is valid, according to Habermas, it is because there
is a consensus that the norm can be justified and derived from a
universally valid moral principle, U, "which. . . is implied by the
presuppositions of argumentation in general." 109 More specifically,
to guarantee a genuinely unforced agreement about a law's norma-
tive rightness, Habermas writes,
every [agreed upon] valid norm has to fulfill the following condition:
U. All affected can [sincerely] accept the consequences and the side
effects its general observance can be anticipated to have for the sat-
isfaction of everyone's interests (and these consequences are pre-
ferred to those of known alternative possibilities).110
Habermas argues that mutual understanding and a rational con-
sensus can be achieved through U. With the epistemological
ground provided by U, a principle of discourse ethics, D, can be
formulated to test whether a contested norm is truly valid. D de-
mands that "[o]nly those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as
participants in practical discourse.""'
If a contested norm meets or could meet the demands of dis-
course ethics, which require an uncoerced, genuine, and fully ra-
tional moral consensus, then the norm is valid. Obviously, the Sec-
retary's gag rule cannot survive the demands of discourse ethics
109. JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 86 (Christian
Lenhardt & Shierry W. Nicholsen trans., 1990).
110. Id. at 65.
111. Id. at 66.
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because indigent women may not participate in practical discourse
affecting them.
3. Positivism and Communicative Action
Since time and space constraints 12 prevent lawmakers from ad-
hering exactly to Habermas's model, institutionalized conditions
should be established by the legal system in order to approxi-
mate" 3 an ideal speech situation. To achieve an ideal speech situa-
tion, three rules must be followed:
(1) The rule of participation, stipulating that each affected per-
son capable of debating the precise issue raised by a validity claim
under discussion may speak;
(2) The rule of equal participation, stipulating that any partici-
pating person may question any assertion, introduce his or her own
assertion into the discourse, and express his or her own relevant
opinions, wishes, needs, attitudes, and sincerely held beliefs; and
(3) The rule of protecting discourses from constraints, stipulating
that no speaker may be prevented by constraints - whether arising
within or outside the discourse - from making use of the rights
established in rules (1) and (2). 114
Obviously, the Secretary's gag rule regulations denying unin-
formed women useful medical advice and information violate all of
the foregoing ethical rules of discourse. Title X grantees may not
discuss the abortion issue with their patients, they may not com-
municate their sincerely held beliefs. More specifically, the Secre-
tary's unconstitutional conditions deny grantees and women the
right to communicate honestly with each other.
The three rules of discourse ethics, which test validity claims for
normative rightness, are irrelevant to positivists" 5 who assert that
the morality of law is a subject that should be the exclusive prov-
112. "Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are subject to the limitations
of time and space." Id. at 92.
113. HABERMAS, supra note 109, at 92.
114. Although the three conditions are rarely observed in practice, they can be used to
evaluate actual discourses. See Lawrence Byard Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action:
A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 54, 96-99 (1989).
115. The several streams of thought that can be categorized as positivism have left a "leg-
acy of convictions and attitudes, problems and techniques, concepts and theories [that] per-
vade contemporary thought." See McCARTHY, supra note 74, at 137-38.
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ince of experts in disciplines such as social theory, political philos-
ophy, or ethics.116 The former United States Solicitor General took
a positivistic position when he insisted that law is "a rather techni-
cal subject, s6mewhat cut off from its ethical, philosophical, and
other heady roots. .... 11117
For most positivists, there are no legal principles that transcend
the legal system.11s The positivists' uncritical conception of a legal
system reinforces the power of economic and bureaucratic subsys-
tems to abridge freedoms that advance everyone's best interests.
"A legal system can be conceived of as a system of reasons for
actions,""19 but laws in force, according to positivism, depend on
the decisions of persons authorized by power-conferring rules.120
Moreover, "propositions that characterize conduct as right or
wrong" ' 1 are not always relevant because positivists claim that
"not all legal standards are grounded in morality.' 22
According to Habermas, "one cannot underestimate the extent
to which the positivistic temper pervade[s] and dominate[s] intel-
lectual and cultural life.' 1 23 Positivism condones the bureaucratiza-
tion of "most of the areas of everyday life.' 1 24 Statists in power
manage the political system's economic problems (scarcities, ine-
qualities, insecurities, crises, etc.). 25 Owing to the complexities of
social management, success-oriented subsystems (economic and
administrative) encroach on the ability of ordinary people to reach
consensus-based agreements about the content of law.1 28
Subsystems that are instrumental in steering society127 become
116. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 357 (1980).
117. Fried, supra note 71, at 332-33.
118. RAZ, supra note 107, at 209 n.2.
119. Id. at 212.
120. Power-conferring rules designate lawmakers to change the legal norms in force and
effect when they are pleased to do so. See id. at 228.
121. EISENBERG, supra note 87, at 14.
122. Id. at 76.
123. HABERMAS AND MODERNITY, supra note 1, at 4-5.
124. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 311 (quoting T. Luckerman, Zwtinge und Freiheiten
im Wandel der Gessellschaftsstruktur, 3 Neve Anthropologie 190 (H. Gadamer & P. Vogler
eds., 1972)).
125. See id. at 343-48.
126. Id. at 326.
127. The subsystems that steer the socio-cultural subsystem include the political-admin-
istrative and the economic bureaucracies of (1) oligopolistic enterprises that are relatively
free of the market restraints of small entrepreneurs and (2) industries such as armaments
which are oriented largely towards production for and consumption by the state. See David
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peculiarly indifferent to the individuals whom they affect. This de-
humanizing process of legal regulation and bureaucratization1 28 has
produced a colossal economic-political-legal Leviathan. Increas-
ingly, individuals are dominated by agencies claiming expertise in
areas of life, such as reproductive autonomy, family relationships,
physical and mental health, and other areas previously left to the
lifeworld. 129 In sum, many private consensual arrangements have
been replaced by a system of social control that paradoxically is
often uncontrollable.
"Viewed historically, the monetarization and bureaucratization
of labor power [replacing feudalism and primitive capitalism] is by
no means a painless process; its price is the destruction of tradi-
tional forms of life."' 30 The price currently exacted seems exces-
sively high since the bureaucracies (commercial, financial and po-
litical-legal-administrative) are not effectively attaining their
strategic goals (e.g., utilizing the most economically productive
method of distributing scarce resources) and are not adapting well
to changing conditions.' 31
Nevertheless, contemporary positivists condone the dominance
of purposive or instrumental rationality, 32 which, according to
Max Weber, 133 leads to "the creation of an 'iron cage' of bureau-
cratic rationality from which there is no escape."'1 34 Worse yet, the
systematized social environment, where there is inadequate space
for consensual agreements, inhibits normatively right and emotion-
ally satisfying kinds of social coordination. These distortions call
into question the positivist's model, which condones institutional-
ized dehumanization.
Held, Crisis Tendencies, Legitimation and the State, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 181
(John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982).
128. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 307-09.
129. For a discussion and definition of "lifeworld," see infra notes 151-159 and accompa-
nying text.
130. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 321.
131. Id.
132. HABERNAS AND MODERNITY, supra note 1, at 5. When individuals think instrumen-
tally and do not think normatively or empathetically, they become incapable of "offering
critical perspectives on social development." DOUGLAS KELLNER, CRITICAL THEORY, MARXISM
AND MODERNITY 96 (1989).
133. In his examination of the aggressively opportunistic spirit of capitalism, Weber
noted how the combination of increasingly complex social subsystems and the need for in-
strumental rationality accelerated the growth of public and private bureaucracies. See, e.g.,
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM I(e) (Talcott Parsons
trans., 1958).
134. HABERMAS AND MODERNITY supra note 1, at 5.
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IV. REALIGNING THE BOUNDARIES OF POWER
A. Unemancipated Public Opinion
As we approach the twenty-first century, inhumane laws are tol-
erated by members of the public who are not always fully aware of
their own best interests. Members of the public cannot free them-
selves from coercive purposive-rational 13 5 social institutions "as
long as they retain the ideological world-picture [of positivism]
which legitimizes them, nor can they [emancipate themselves
from] their ideological world-picture [of positivism] as long as their
basic coercive social institutions render [their worldview] immune
to free discussion and criticism."' 136
Supreme Court opinions like Rust facilitate the state's massive
penetration into private spheres of freedom. Unfortunately, a Su-
preme Court opinion upholding an immoral law (or agency rule)
creates the false belief that immoral laws are legitimate, even when
they obliterate the reasonable expectations of individuals and
groups.
Vaclav Havel was surely right when he said, "there is no full
freedom where full truth is not given free passage."'137 Full truth
will never be given free passage so long as the federal courts rub-
berstamp agency rules that condition benefits on the recipients'
willingness to withhold medical information needed by women.
When the government exacts silence or censored speech as the
quid pro quo for a benefit or subsidy, human beings are manipu-
lated as objects of government policy. Even if the government's
ends are justifiable, certainly its manipulative use of hush money is
not. The persons most severely affected by the benefit-dispensing
gag rule upheld in Rust are the clients of the grantees, who are
often young, poor, pregnant women urgently needing trustworthy
advice.
Unfortunately, the media's coverage of the gag rule issue empha-
sizes the strategic-reasoning of the rhetoricians hired by the con-
tending pressure groups. This kind of reporting impoverishes pub-
135. "[P]urposive-rational action ... refers to actions or systems of action in which ele.
ments of rational decision and instrumentally efficient implementation of technical knowl-
edge predominate." McCARTHY, supra note 74, at 29.
136. RAYMOND GEuss, THE IDEA OF A CRIcAL THEORY: HABERMAS AND THE FRANKFURT
SCHOOL 60 (1981).
'137. Waldheim Won't Seek Re-election, RICHMOND TIMEs-DSPATCH, June 22, 1991, at A-
4, col. 6.
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lic discourse, and does not generate a fully rational consensus
concerning the validity of agency rules that are insensitive to the
oppression of women. When public opinion is not sufficiently criti-
cal, informed, organized, persuasive, and heard, the President,
Congress and the administrative agencies do not heed the public
interest.
B. Towards a More Informed, Effective Public Opinion
Many individuals are victimized by their own self-imposed pas-
sivity. This passivity results in members of the public becoming
unreflective spectators watching inside-the-beltway power strug-
gles. Habermas's critical theory challenges the public to alter the
existing boundaries of power. 38 More specifically, individuals must
realize that their inability to discern their own best interests is
partially the result of their own readiness to accept, without ade-
quate cross-examination and protest, "an increasingly dense net-
work of legal norms" implemented by bureaucracies.' 9 This Levia-
than is often the source of personal problems and rarely helps
people solve "problems of mutual understanding."140
Excessive power is entrusted to administrative agencies that are
neither politically accountable nor adequately responsive to the
public. As a result, the least powerful and least affluent segments
of the population are deceived and exploited by rules implement-
ing dysfunctional social welfare programs.
In the United States, the federal courts have done virtually
nothing to diminish the power of bureaucracies. Agency rules and
orders are presumed valid, even when the statutory source of the
agency's practically unfettered discretion is unclear, if not unintel-
ligible. The United States, like other nations, has been unable to
control abuses of power by agencies.
Habermas's "'classic' texts in social theory"' 4' describe how the
steering systems that colonize the lifeworld disable society from
"exercis[ing] an influence over itself by the neutral means of politi-
138. GEUSS, supra note 136, at 61.
139. JtGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIsCOURSE OF MODERNITY 361 (Fredrick Law-
rence trans., 1987).
140. See id. at 363.
141. FRED R. DALLMAYR, CRITICAL ENCOUNTERS: BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS 73
(1987).
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cal-administrative power."' 42 Society can regain more control over
itself in the United States only if the people can renew, enliven,
and enrich public debates through discourse ethics.
Towards this end, Habermas identifies the conditions for a
"communicatively achieved consensus"' 43 capable of recognizing
when validity claims have universally binding force. A speaker's
validity claim is warranted if it is supported by convincing grounds
concerning (a) "existing states of affairs," (b) the rightness of the
claim given the applicable normative context of "legitimately regu-
lated interpersonal relationships," and (c) the speaker's own sub-
jective world to which the speaker has privileged access." The
term "universally binding force" in this context refers to the dispo-
sition of speaking and acting subjects to act on the basis of a con-
sensus produced by cogent arguments and shared learning.
45
Agency officials and members of the public need to reach mutu-
ally satisfactory understandings, 46 uncontaminated by agencies
that manipulate anomic public opinion. 147 Agency ruleihaking pro-
cedures must be reconstituted in ways allowing "impulses from the
lifeworld . . . to enter into the self-steering of functional sys-
tems." 48 If rulemaking procedures permit more public participa-
tion, then informed members of the public can "develop the pru-
dent combination of power and intelligent self-restraint that is
needed to sensitize the self-steering mechanisms of the state and
the economy to the goal-oriented outcomes of radical democratic
will formation.' 49
C. The Latent Power of the Lifeworld
Habermas abandons the dichotomy between the individual (qua
Cartesian self-referential, power-seeking subject) and society (qua
identity-obliterating, organic collective). It is replaced with a
model of ongoing communicative action that is "carried or sup-
142. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 361.
143. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATION-
ALIZATION OF Socmry 13 (1984).
144. HABERMAS, supra note 109, at 58.
145. MICHAEL PUSEY, JORGEN HABERMAS 80, 83, 120 (1987).
146. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 296.
147. HABERMAS, supra note 76, at 3 (society becomes anomic when the consensual founda-
tions of traditional normative structures are severely impaired).
148. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 364.
149. Id. at 365.
[Vol. 26:87
RUST v. SULLIVAN
ported from behind, as it were, by a lifeworld that not only forms
the context for the process of reaching understanding but also fur-
nishes resources for it."'150
The lifeworld is a warehouse of unquestioned cultural givens."'
This warehouse of presuppositions comes to the foreground when
members of society "construct, negotiate, and reconstruct the so-
cial meanings of their world."'152 As Habermas writes: "[i]nsofar as
speakers and hearers straightforwardly achieve a mutual under-
standing about something in the world, they move within the hori-
zon of their common lifeworld; 153 this remains in the background
of the participants - as an intuitively known, unproblematic, and
unanalyzable, holistic background." '154
After an item in the lifeworld's store of knowledge becomes rele-
vant to a situation or discussion, it can become knowledge in a
strict epistemological sense. 5 When a discussion reaches the stage
of decisionmaking, any taken-for-granted background knowledge
can be tested by discourse ethics, which is a mode of discourse
quite different from unreflective everyday conversation.
Although culturally ingrained "always-in-the-background" as-
sumptions resist thematization, 56 the three "universal struc-
tures' 57 that transcend the everyday conversation of participants
interacting in the lifeworld5 s  are culture, society, and
personality.159
Culture denotes that reservoir of knowledge "from which those
engaged in communicative action draw [their viewpoints] suscepti-
ble of consensus as they come to an understanding about some-
thing in the world."'160 This pre-given, pre-reflective, pre-theoreti-
cal context can be brought to the foreground and expressed in
150. HABERMAS, supra note 109, at 135.
151. Id.
152. HABERMAS AND MODERMTY, supra note 1, at 22.
153. "The lifeworld forms a horizon and at the same time offers a store of things taken
for granted in the given culture from which communicative participants draw consensual
interpretive patterns in their efforts [to reach understandings]." HABERMAS, supra note 139,
at 298.
154. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 298.
155. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 124.
156. Background assumptions are not identifiable until a situation brings to mind a rele-
vant and problematic segment of the lifeworld. See HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 299.
157. Id. at 343.
158. Id. at 299.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 343.
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statements asserting validity claims. The validity claims can be ex-
posed to the rigorous tests of discourse ethics. The person to whom
a validity claim is addressed can respond either by saying "yes" or
"no" based on reasons. Any new consensual agreement adds to the
culture's stock of knowledge. 6'
Society, in the narrower sense of the word, as it is used by
Habermas, describes the traditional normative order. Because con-
ceptions of morality are always embedded in the customs of a time
and place in history, or in what Hegel called Sittlichkeit, discourse
ethics enables the participants to expand their intellectual hori-
zons, escape from traditional shibboleths, and advance everyone's
best interests.
Personality, the third lifeworld structure, refers to "acquired
competences that render a subject capable of speech and argumen-
tation and hence able to participate in processes of mutual under-
standing in a given context and to maintain his own identity in the
shifting contexts of interaction.' '1 62
The latent content of the three component structures (culture,
society, and personality) corresponds to each individual's differen-
tiated objective, social, and subjective worlds. The same three
lifeworld structures can be described functionally and diachroni-
cally as processes of cultural reproduction, social integration and
socialization. Habermas writes:
Cultural reproduction ensures that (in the semantic dimension)
newly arising situations can be connected up with existing condi-
tions in the world; it secures the continuity of tradition and a coher-
ency of knowledge sufficient for the consensus needs for everyday
practice. Social integration ensures that the newly arising situations
(in [norm regulated] social space) can be connected up with existing
conditions in the world; it takes care of the coordination of action by
means of legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships and
lends constancy to the identity of groups. Finally, the socialization
of members ensures that newly arising situations (in the dimension
of historical time) can be connected up with existing world condi-
tions; it secures the acquisition of generalized capacities for action
for future generations and takes care of harmonizing individual life
histories and collective life forms. 168
161. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 132-33.
162. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 343.
163. Id. at 343-44.
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Habermas's insights direct attention to the evolution of society
which, through discourse ethics, can lead to beneficial changes if
society can withstand the imperialism of economic and bureau-
cratic steering agencies. The Secretary's gag rule interferes with
cultural reproduction; it also impedes social integration and social-
ization because it does not allow Title X grantees and their clients
to participate in the process of mutual understanding.
D. The Uncoupling of Steering System and Lifeworld
In Habermas's analysis, the uncoupling of system and lifeworld
occurs when the resources of the lifeworld are colonized, exploited,
taken, and taxed by the self-steering subsystems in society.
Habermas writes, "In modern societies, economic and bureaucratic
spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via
money and power.''164
Instrumentally rational subsystems "penetrate [into] the core
domains of cultural reproduction, social integration and socializa-
tion."'' 5 Habermas questions "whether under these changed prem-
ises it still makes any sense to speak of 'a society exercising influ-
ence upon itself."'16
What can be done? Habermas develops his theory of discourse
ethics in order to secure the conditions for freedom, enlarged
lifeworld space, and greater equality of opportunity:
The point is to protect areas of life that are functionally dependent
on social integration through values, norms, and consensus forma-
tion, to preserve them from falling prey to the systemic imperatives
of economic and administrative subsystems growing with dynamics
of their own, and to defend them from becoming converted over,
through the steering medium of the law, to a principle of sociation
that is, for them, dysfunctional 67
The problems of resisting the expanding quasi-autonomous eco-
164. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 154.
165. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 355.
166. HABERMAS, supra note 139. Then Professor, now Justice, Scalia wrote, "There is
abroad in our land the feeling that we no longer control our government, but it controls us,
through thousands of law-making functionaries in every field of life who are effectively be-
yond popular control." Antonin Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False Remedy for System
Overload, 3 REG. 19, 26 (1979).
167. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 372-73.
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nomic and administrative subsystems are formidable, perhaps in-
surmountable. Apathetic citizens are numerous and adequately in-
formed voters are few. Single issue pressure groups negotiate
instrumentally rational compromises with this committee of Con-
gress or that executive agency. Logrolling and pork-barrel politics
are not sufficiently criticized because of the widespread indiffer-
ence on the part of the public. As David Riesman wrote:
[These "new indifferents" are not] devoid of political opinions....
But ... the ... indifferents do not believe that, by virtue of any-
thing they do, know, or believe, they can buy a political package
that will substantially improve their lives. And so, subject to occa-
sional manipulations, they tend to view politics in most of its large-
scale forms as if they were spectators. 68
Habermas observes, "[I]n the manipulated public sphere an accla-
mation-prone mood comes to predominate, an opinion climate in-
stead of public opinion."169
To make matters worse, the powers of administrative agencies
"are expanded in such a way that their activity can no longer be
considered a mere execution of the law.' 17 0 Bureaucrats are given
virtually free rein because statutes contain no intelligible direction
concerning most of the specific issues to be resolved by agencies.
As the system of "bureaucratic disempowering"'' expands, the
desire to rein in the bureaucracy becomes the dire need to avoid
the danger of creeping totalitarianism. The federal courts, how-
ever, even with the power of judicial review over agency action,
cannot adequately reduce abuses of discretion by administrative
agencies.
A theory of discourse ethics under these circumstances calls to
mind the claim that theories have no consequences in the real
world. 17 2 But such a claim makes us less conscious of the critical
need to transform the theory of discourse ethics into institutional-
ized practices that ameliorate the dehumanizing effects produced
by corporate hierarchies and the administrative state.
168. JORGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 217
(Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989) (quoting DAVID RIESMAN, THE LONELY
CROWD 189-90 (1950)).
169. Id.
170. HABERMAS, supra note 168, at 179.
171. HABERMAS, supra note 103, at 325.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 79-85.
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E. Emancipatory Discourse Ethics as a Potential Alternative to
System Dominance
Habermas argues that the law's validity depends on reflective
discursive testing rather than "mere de facto acceptance . . . of
habitual practices."'1 3 Indeed, because of the general and unavoid-
able presuppositions of achieving [intersubjective] understanding
in language, 7 4 participants in discourse ethics can "bring about a
[consensus] that terminates in the intersubjective mutuality of re-
ciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and ac-
cord with one another. 1 75 Since "[v]alidity claims are internally
connected with reasons and grounds,"' 6 valid law depends on the
use of reason 7 to achieve an acceptable and supportable
agreement.178
According to Habermas, there are "three different aspects of va-
lidity." 9 More specifically, a citizen can challenge and contest the
validity claim of a lawmaker in part or in toto by either disputing
the truth of the validity claim, the rightness of a proposed law, or
the truthfulness of the intention expressed by the lawmaker.180 If
there is a consensus about (1) truthfulness of lawmakers, (2) the
instrumental rationality of a proposed law, and (3) its normative
rightness, then the proposed law, if enacted, is valid.
The validity thesis of discourse ethics emphasizes legitimacy and
consensus not power. Even positivists agree that social stability is
secured best by a widely shared sense that the law should be vol-
untarily obeyed. The social system, however, needs a normative
anchor.8 If enough reflective citizens engage in discourse ethics
and decide that an immoral law or agency rule does not deserve
their voluntary obedience, then the system will sense the pressure
173. HABERIAS, supra note 109, at 19.
174. See JtIrgen Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF Socmry 1 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1979).
175. Id. at 3.
176. Id. at 313.
177. HABERMAS, supra note 143, at x, (Editor's introduction).
178. Id.
179. HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 313.
180. Id.
181. Habermas's work on systems theory and theories of socialization and communication
help us better understand "how to conceive of society as at once socially and systemically
integrated." Thomas McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruc-
tion, in CoNrTEmoRARY CRTIcAL THEORY 156 (1991).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
from its hostile environment and officials will be more likely to re-
spond to consensus-based criticism.
F. The Supreme Court's Statism
Agencies have a duty to support their rules with a reasoned ex-
planation.182 A fully reasoned explanation would demonstrate
whether or not an agency rule is normatively unconscionable.
Rust,8 3 however, demands far less of administrative agencies. Re-
call that many low-income women depend on Title X projects.184
Nevertheless, Title X health care providers may not disclose what
they know about a pregnant woman's options.
Contrary to Habermas's model of unforced agreements, Title X
providers do not fully disclose: (a) their knowledge of existing
medically appropriate alternatives; (b) their intentions to deceive;
and, (c) their own views concerning what is morally right. Although
the instrumentally rational Title X regulations might reduce the
incidence of abortion, they mislead the gullible, unwary, and unso-
phisticated women who have been lured into the program.'85 In
this way, the federal government is regulating access to reliable
medical advice, a scarce economic resource.' 86 Not everyone can
buy the information needed to make a knowledgeable decision
about their future.
After observing how government largess is an increasing neces-
sity, 8  Charles Reich wrote:
One of the most important developments in the United States [since
1950] has been the emergence of government as a major source of
wealth. Government is a gigantic syphon. It draws in revenue and
power, and pours forth wealth: money, benefits, services, contracts,
franchises, and licenses. Government has always had this function.
182. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
183. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
184. Other women who would have sought advice elsewhere but for the convenience of the
Title X project discover, after paying the fee, that they have purchased misleading informa-
tion. See Massachusetts v. Sullivan, 899 F.2d 53, 70 (1st Cir. 1990).
185. The regulations are crafted in a fashion which "constitutes a trap for the mostly
unsophisticated and unwary patients" at a Title X clinic. New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d
401, 415 (2d Cir. 1989) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
186. "The greatest force of a modem government lies in its power to regulate access to
scarce resources." Kreimer, supra note 96, at 1296.
187. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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But while in early times it was minor, today's distribution of largess
is on a vast, imperial scale. 18
Paraphrasing Reich, dependent welfare recipients become trapped
in an underclass more horrific than feudalistic serfdom.
189
According to the Court, these individuals have no one to blame
but themselves, since the surrender of precious rights in return for
a federal grant is a "voluntary" exchange. 190 Even though the regu-
lations do not meet a poor woman's need for advice, Rehnquist's
opinion echoes an economist's disdain for the word "needs." Many
economists explain:
Most of us are in the habit of thinking of.... needs. Some needs
are even claimed to be "vital", "urgent", "crying," . . . or "critical."
Yet, as ringing as these words can be, they have no basis in
fact ....
...Everyone, no matter how poor, will give up some of one good
if offered enough of other goods.' 9'
According to economists preoccupied with supply and demand
curves, the word "needs" is substituted incorrectly for the word
preference. Nevertheless, the opposite is true; economists conflate
needs and preferences incorrectly since human beings choose their
preferences, whereas human needs (e.g., sense of personal identity,
sleep, water) exist regardless of their choice. 92
Rust supports the suggestion that the subject of administrative
law is "an oxymoron."' 93 "[P]articularly appalling to constitutional
scholars,' 9 4 whether or not they support Roe v. Wade,' 95 is the
Court's assault on the First Amendment 9 ' and the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions.
188. Id.
189. Reich referred to the new feudalism, a metaphor that updated Weber's "iron cage."
Id. at 768-71.
190. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
191. ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, Co-
ORDINATION & CONTROL 20 (1983).
192. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 139 (1987).
193. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2072 (1990).
194. Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and The Supreme Court, 38 N.Y. REv. OF
BOOKS 23 (1991) (book review).
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
196. The First Amendment was one of Justice O'Connor's primary concerns. See Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1788 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The statism of the Court disappoints progressive thinkers like
Kathleen Sullivan who helped write the brief for the losing peti-
tioners in Rust.1' 7 The Court's statism is no less disappointing to
libertarians who believe unborn children should be protected by
the government. No tolerant compassionate democract can be
pleased by regulations that "prescribe what [ideas] shall be ortho-
dox"'' 9 when women ask physicians about their health-related
options.
Rust encourages the subsystems of the administrative state to
impinge intrusively upon lifeworld processes of identity-forma-
tion,19 sociation, and social integration. The Secretary's regula-
tions deny to many women a right to discuss which reproductive
choices are normatively right without being manipulated, deceived,
or coerced.200 As Habermas wrote, there is a need to protect func-
tions of human life that are largely dependent on consensus forma-
tion "from . . .systemic imperatives of economic and administra-
tive subsystems growing with dynamics of their own." 0' 1 The
Rehnquist Court, however, seems eager to accommodate the
subsystems.
Although Rust still recognizes the university as a "traditional
sphere of free expression,"202 the Court's contrived dichotomy be-
tween "traditional spheres of free expression" and spheres of gov-
ernment-controlled speech shrinks the "marketplace of ideas." As
a result, there is a significant inequality of opportunity in the na-
tion's system of free expression. Not everyone can afford a univer-
sity and not everyone who visits a Title X project can afford pri-
vate health care. Given the government's power to dominate the
marketplace of ideas by creating restricted-speech zones, the Court
provides less than adequate conditions for truth-seeking. Of
course, the best reason for protecting the marketplace of ideas is
not the proven ability of the market to provide truth, but the fre-
197. See Brief for Petitioner, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 89-1391).
198. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989).
199. "Government indoctrination on the morality of abortion [obviously] hinders a wo-
man's ability to choose for herself how to order the most intimate aspects of her own life."
Janet Benshoof, Comment, The Chastity Act: Government Manipulation of Abortion Infor-
mation and the First Amendment, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1916, 1936 (1988).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 42-59.
201. HABERmAs, supra note 103, at 373.
202. 111 S. Ct. at 1776.
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quently evidenced desire of the government to conceal
information.10
In Rust, the Court chose to endorse regulations that are one-
sided. For example, doctors are now required to advise patients:
"Let's see now, Ms. Smith, you have the option of bearing children
or the option of. . .uh, bearing children."
The Secretary justifies his gag rule as an efficient means of
preventing a slide into "moral relativism."204 Yet he also relies on
an alleged shift in the public's attitude concerning the "elimination
of unborn children by abortion. 20 5 This is curious reasoning. If the
Secretary opposes moral relativism, then his policies should not
change in accordance with transitory and unreflective attitudinal
shifts. It follows from Rust, however, that when the President's
policy changes, an agency may suddenly change its interpretations
of statutes.
The Court and the Secretary agree that "[t]he Department's re-
sponsibility. . . is to implement the choice that Congress made in
enacting section 1008. 1 206 The catch-22 created by Rust is this: al-
though required to implement Congress' choices, the Secretary ac-
tually decides what policy is mandated by Congress, and the Court
asks virtually no questions so long as the Secretary's choice is not
inconsistent with Congress' clear intent with respect to the precise
issue in question.0 Because of the discretion given to rulemaking
agencies by Rust, government subsidies may now be used as lever-
age to reduce the number of health providers who are free to tell
women that abortion is one of their legal options.
Agencies obviously may not directly abridge First Amendment
rights. However what agencies may not do directly, they may do by
withholding allocated funds as a sanction. Regulators get away
with this strategy, since the Court asserts that any applicant for
Title X funds "retains the choice of complying or not. ' 20 As for
the women who suffer, they are victimized by the Court's weak-
ened doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
Rust is unprecedented; indeed "[t]he right of the doctor to ad-
203. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 34 (1982).
204. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988)(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59).
205. 111 S. Ct. at 1769.
206. 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 59).
207. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
208. Kreimer, supra note 96, at 1304.
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vise his patients according to his best lights seems so obviously
within [the] First Amendment ... as to need no extended discus-
sion."2 ' In the past, the Court rejected government efforts "to
wedge [its] . . . message discouraging abortion into the privacy of
the informed-consent dialogue . *.."1o The suppression of ideas is
absolutely proscribed by the First Amendment,211 or so it seemed
until Rust upheld the power of the executive branch to censor the
speech of doctors who accept Title X funds.
The Rust majority claims that the government's conditions only
indirectly212 affect the speech of those who apply for federal grants
and only collaterally affect the needs of women. The' majority's
opinion unrealistically maintains that the disqualified grantees
(and their patients) are no worse off than they were before the reg-
ulations were issued. 13
How far does this fallacious logic of the Court extend? Does it
follow that the Secretary could make grant applicants renounce
their memberships in pro-choice organizations? Certainly, that
cannot be 'the law. And yet, according to Rust, choosing speech-
restrictive conditions is entirely up to the rulemaking agency. This
unabashed statism is hardly designed to protect the best interests
of impecunious pregnant women who are treated ignominiously as
if they are not morally responsible enough to be fully informed.
The pregnant women deprived of medical advice are medically
and financially worse off after they enter the Title X project than
they were before they visited the clinic. Nevertheless, the Court
insists that "'[tihere is a basic difference between direct state in-
terference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an
alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.' ",214 There-
fore, the Court did not require the Secretary to shoulder the bur-
den of persuasion demonstrating the absence of less onerous alter-
209. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting from majority's rul-
ing Qn standing).
210. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762
(1986); see also City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416,
443-44 (1983).
211. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
212. Labelling an effect "indirect" is often misleading rhetoric. The underlying thought is
merely that "the law is not indifferent to considerations of degree." Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238, 327 (1936) (quoting A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 554 (1935)) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
213. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1777 (1991).
214. Id. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977)).
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natives,21 5 even though many women are harmed and exploited by
the Secretary's regulations.
For more than a decade, there was reason to believe that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine had more bite, but the War-
ren Court's question begging focus on overbreadth 16 did not deal
substantively with the "greater and lesser" doctrine. 21" This doc-
trine is the nemesis of a normative theory of unconstitutional con-
ditions which would require judges to evaluate the externalities of
bargains negotiated between the government and its grantees.
Justice Holmes, the quintessential pragmatist, was unable "to
understand how a condition can be unconstitutional when attached
to a matter over which a State has absolute arbitrary power."218
Holmes's befuddlement notwithstanding, the doctrine of the
greater and the lesser obviously is inapplicable in some cases; for
example, the State does not have the lesser power to punish fe-
males simply because it has the greater power to punish both
males and females.
Many landmark judicial opinions more sensitively protect First
Amendment rights. For example, Keyishian 6. Board of Regents21 9
forbids states to precondition employment "upon the surrender of
constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govern-
ment action."220 Perry v. Sindermann221 makes it clear that the
government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests -- especially, his
interest in freedom of speech. '222
In Rutan v. Republican Party,223 the Court reiterated the
maxim: "What the First Amendment precludes the government
from commanding directly, it also precludes the government from
215. The Court simply asserted that the government may favor childbirth over abortion,
but this does not necessarily mean that the government interest outweighs the competing
First Amendment values at stake. Id. at 1774-75.
216. The overbreadth technique decides speech problems evasively and "often more
sketchily" than an "open confrontation." See GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1188 (10th ed. 1980).
217. See Kreimer, supra note 96, at 1308.
218. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 53 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
219. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
220. Id. at 605.
221. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
222. Id. at 597 (dictum).
223. 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
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accomplishing indirectly. '224 Rust adopts a different approach sup-
posedly because the government is not denying a benefit or a privi-
lege to anyone; it "is instead simply insisting that public funds be
spent for the purposes for which they were authorized. 2 25
Rust is at odds with analogous tax exemption cases.226 In FCC v.
League of Women Voters, s7 for example, the Court stated that in
cases involving the spending power, "[a] regulation of speech that
is motivated by nothing more than a desire to curtail expression of
a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest
is the purest example of a 'law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.' 11228 The Rust majority contracted the
scope of League of Women Voters and relied on dicta in Regan v.
Taxation with Representation of Washington.220
In Regan, the appellee, Taxation with Representation, ("TWR")
was not entitled to a tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") if it engaged in lobbying.230 Al-
though the Court held that section 501(c)(3) did not violate the
First Amendment rights of TWR, Regan is arguably distinguisha-
ble from Rust because TWR remains eligible for a tax exemption
under Code section 501(c)(4).231 Moreover, the Code is not aimed
at suppressing TWR's ideas.23 2 In short, TWR's First Amendment
rights are not substantially burdened because it has an adequate
opportunity to obtain a tax exemption. In Rust, however, there are
no other federal subsidies are available for grantees who provide
non-directive options counseling. Of course, grantees are not pre-
cluded from counseling women about options if they do so in a
different forum, physically separated from a Title X facility. 33
This alternative does not help the women who are misled by the
224. Id. at 2738-39.
225. 111 S. Ct. at 1774.
226. See e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser, the Court wrote, "To
deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penal-
ize them for such speech. . . . The denial is 'frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.' "Id. at 518-19 (quoting American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402
(1950)).
227. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
228. Id. at 383-84 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
229. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
230. Id. at 542.
231. Id. at 551.
232. Id. at 548.
233. 111 S. Ct. at 1774-75.
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advice obtained in a Title X facility.234
As interpreted by the Rust majority, Regan, without any qualifi-
cations or reservations, supports the proposition that a "'legisla-
ture's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a [First Amend-
ment] right does not infringe the right.' -1235 In other words, the
Court's strict compelling interest test does not apply even if a con-
ditioned government subsidy discriminates on the basis of speech
content.
2 31
In Rust, petitioners relied upon Arkansas Writers Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, but Chief Justice Rehnquist found this reliance
misplaced.37
That case involved a state sales tax which discriminated between
magazines on the basis of their content. Relying on this fact, and on
the fact that the tax "targets a small group within the press," con-
trary to our decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minne-
sota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575... (1983), the Court held the
tax invalid. But we have here not the case of a general law singling
out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of
the Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, which
are specifically excluded from scope of the project funded. 38
The so-called "small group" of magazines targeted in Arkansas
Writers Project included all the general interest magazines that
were taxed, as compared with the religious, professional, trade and
sports journals that remained tax exempt. If general interest
magazines are a small targeted group, then so are impecunious
pregnant women.
234. The rights of female patients were asserted by the plaintiff grantees. Id. at 1766.
235. Id. at 1772 (quoting Regan v Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540, 549 (1983)).
236. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 549; Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
236 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Rust, the Court did not concede that the Secretary's
regulations discriminated on the basis of viewpoint, but they did. A regulation is viewpoint
neutral when it "'does not favor either side of a political controversy,'" Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 319 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 537 (1980)), and does not "regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas
at the expense of others." City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
237. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
238. 111 S. Ct. at 1773.
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G. Paying Lip Service to Prudential Canons of Judicial
Restraint
In Rust, the Court applied the formula of statutory interpreta-
tion embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. e39 Chevron and its progeny hold that where a
court's statutory interpretation fails to reveal a congressional pur-
pose contrary to the challenged agency action, the court should ac-
cept a reasonable agency construction. 40 Since agencies are in the
best position to understand the implications of their enabling
act,24' Chevron's defenders claim that, "[b]ecause of their superior
accountability, expertise, and ability to coordinate complex enact-
239. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984). Chevron upheld an Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) rule under the Clean Air Act § 172(b)(6), 42 U.S.C. §
7502(b)(6)(1977), allowing states to treat all pollution emitting sources within the same in-
dustrial group as though they were just one source. Before the 1980's, any pollution emitting
device within a plant was viewed as a separate source. In 1981, the EPA began focusing on
the emissions emitted from the entire plant, and thereafter plants were permitted to modify
existing sources of pollution so long as the modification did not produce an additional net
increase in pollution. EPA's policy change (the so-called bubble concept) gave "company
management greater control over specific decisions affecting air quality as long as the total
impact of a plant on air quality [was] not affected negatively by those decisions." RICHARD J.
PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 406
(1985). "The question for decision in Chevron was whether the plantwide definition of
'source' violated the Clean Air Act." Sunstein, supra note 193, at 2083. The Supreme Court
upheld EPA's new interpretation because Congress never addressed the specific issue of
whether a "source" (the statutory term in question) referred to an entire plant or only part
of a plant.
240. Even in pure questions of statutory interpretation that do not depend on the specific
facts of the rulemaking record, the Court will accept the agency's construction of the stat-
ute, if it is reasonable, unless Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue in
the case at bar. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45. Before Chevron, courts showed a much more
pronounced tendency to interpret statutes "independently when pure questions or major
questions were involved and primary interpretive authority had not been delegated [clearly]
to the agencies." Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens
and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 19 (1990).
241. How should a court decide, under the Chevron approach, whether Congress in 1970
delegated to the Secretary power in 1988 to deny federal funds to grantees who wish to
counsel persons concerning abortion? Several factors should be taken into account by courts
when Congress' intent to delegate is not clear. The following is a partial list:
1. Is the agency competent enough to be entrusted with the virtually unreviewable
responsibility to interpret the statute in accordance with its preferred policy choices?
2. Has the agency earned a reputation for fairness, reliability, and a capability to
resist undue political pressures?
3. Is the agency empowered to make legislative rules that have the same force and
effect as statutes or is it merely given power to clarify, by interpretive rules, pre-
existing statutory norms? If the agency is not given the power to make legislative
rules, then judicial review should not be extremely deferential on pure questions of
statutory construction.
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ments, agencies should be given the benefit of every doubt. '242 The
Court has emphasized that "[w]hen an agency is charged with ad-
ministering a statute part of the authority it receives is the power
to give reasonable content to the statute's textual ambiguities.
243
Nevertheless, "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court
[should] construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.
244
There is obviously tension between Chevron and prudential doc-
trines admonishing judges to construe statutes narrowly whenever
agency action presents "a significant risk" of unconstitutionality.
245
Invocation of Chevron was a surprise to astute commentators
who had incorrectly assumed that "[w]hen constitutionally based
norms conflict with an agency's interpretation [of a statute], it is
highly probable that the agency's view will not prevail. '246 Indeed,
before Rust, it seemed "implausible" to assert that "agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutes- [would] prevail even if the conse-
quence of those interpretations was to produce invalidity or to
raise serious constitutional doubts. '247 In NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago,248 for example, the Court went so far as to "se-
verely strain[] the statutory text in order to avoid a constitutional
question. '249 The Court did not defer to the NLRB's interpreta-
tion of the governing statute since "[t]he values enshrined in the
First Amendment plainly rank high 'in the scale of our national
values' [and] [i]n keeping with the Court's prudential policy it is
incumbent on us to determine whether the Board's exercise of its
242. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 444 (1989). Sunstein himself is far less supportive of Chevron. See id.
243. Department of the Treasury v. FLRA, 110 S. Ct. 1623, 1629 (1990) (citing Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
244. Brief for Petitioners, at 37, Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (No. 89-1391)
(quoting Edward DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
245. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979). In Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, Justice O'Connor referred to the "venerable principle" of avoiding
constitutional questions. 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3060 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
246. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 2112.
247. Id. at 2113, quoted in Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1780 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
248. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
249. William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REy.
1007, 1022 (1989).
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jurisdiction here would give rise to serious constitutional
questions. ' '250
The Catholic Bishop rule 5' has been applied in many cases. In
Edward J. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council,2 52 the Court described its policy of
judicial restraint as follows:
[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would
raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress. This cardinal principle . . . is
beyond debate . . . . "[T]he elementary rule is that every reasona-
ble construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality." This approach . . .recognizes that Congress,
like this Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Con-
stitution. The courts will therefore not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp
power constitutionally forbidden it.25'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Rust, 54 conceded that:
The principle ... is a categorical one: "as between two possible in-
terpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitu-
tional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which
will save the Act." This principle is based at least in part on the fact
that a decision to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional "is the
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to
perform. '255
250. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501.
251. In the 1980's, the Court refused to interpret statutes expansively whenever a nar-
rowed construction would avoid an interpretation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 240-43 (1984) (laws banning travel to Cuba narrowly construed to avoid
potential conflict with due process clause); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
599 n.24 (1983) (Court abstained from addressing equal protection clause issues by narrowly
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S.
70, 82 (1982) (absent clear statement of congressional intent, Bankruptcy Act was construed
narrowly to avoid deciding "difficult and sensitive questions" of constitutional law); Indus-
trial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst. 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980) (construing Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act narrowly to avoid resolving issue of unconstitutional delega-
tion). Many other citations appear in Eskridge, supra note 249, at 1022.
252. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
253. Id. at 575 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1985)).
254. In Chapman v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 1927 (1991), decided seven days after
Rust, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, " '[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to,
in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.'"
255. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1771 (1991) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S.
142, 148 (1927)).
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The Chief Justice, by some sleight of logic, concluded that the Sec-
retary's regulations did not raise the sort of "grave and doubtful
constitutional questions that would lead us to assume Congress did
not intend to authorize their issuance. '256
Having chosen to hold that the Secretary's regulations were au-
thorized by Title X, the Court considered several grave and doubt-
ful First Amendment questions. For example, may an agency cen-
sor the speech of health care providers? Since the health care
providers in Rust were employed in a federally funded project, the
Court explained that "the employees' freedom of expression is lim-
ited during the time that they actually work for the project; but
this limitation is a consequence of their decision to accept employ-
ment in a project, the scope of which is permissibly restricted by
the funding authority. 2 57 Rust therefore endorses the "dangerous
proposition" that "the First Amendment . . . tolerate[s] any gov-
ernmental restriction upon an employee's speech so long as that
restriction is limited to the funded workplace. '258
The Court's unnecessary and unwise deference to the Secretary
dramatically demonstrates the "large-scale shift in the allocation
of authority within American institutions. '"25 9 As a result, the peo-
ple's right to participate in democratic decisionmaking is subordi-
nated to the autocratic use of bureaucratic power.
V. PAINFUL LESSONS LEARNED FROM Rust
The Secretary's regulations stigmatize poor pregnant women as
inferior human beings who cannot be trusted as responsible moral
agents if they are fully informed by their health care providers.
The bargain between the government and Title X grantees pre-
sumably is, so far as the contracting parties are concerned, mutu-
ally beneficial. The agency, however, did not adequately consider
the interests of low income women whose needs and aspirations
256. Id. at 1771 (quoting United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408
(1909)). Rehnquist did not think that Rust was a close case, and he stated, "There is no
question but that the statutory prohibition contained in § 1008 is constitutional." Id. at
1772.
257. Id. at 1775.
258. Id. at 1783 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
259. Sunstein, supra note 193, at 2077. The Court in NLRB v. United Food & Commer-
cial Workers Union held that judicial deference is required even when the issue resolved by
the agency involves a pure question of statutory construction, since an agency must be ac-
corded "deference ... as long as its interpretation is rational and consistent with the stat-
ute." 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987).
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were deliberately neglected in order to achieve political objectives
that were not related to health. Other foreboding messages sent by
Rust v. Sullivan include:
1. Women suffer the social costs (i.e., the externalities 260) of many
agency rules and they cannot count on courts to nullify morally ab-
horrent agency rules. The Rehnquist Court marginalizes, if not ig-
nores, the reasonable expectations of low-income, pregnant women.
2. The least powerful segments in our society are usually the hard-
est hit when agencies use financial disincentives.
3. Conditional grant programs exploit the dependency of organiza-
tions and entities in order to make them supporters of federal pol-
icy. In effect, the recipients of government funds are deputized as
agents, if not puppets, of the federal government.
4. The Department of Health and Human Services, notwithstand-
ing its more than 123,000 employees, 262 has become too remote from
the everyday lives of the ordinary people they serve and govern.26 2
5. The enormous amount of money that Congress appropriates
each year attracts self-interested groups who lobby for morally in-
sensitive agency rules that are valuable to them. 263 The Courts de-
cline to interfere, even when the loser in the lobbying contest is free-
dom of speech.
6. Contributions of money by Political Action Committees
("PAC") enable interest groups to exert powerful influences on the
single issue that they care about, thereby diminishing and diluting
the influence of the general public during the rulemaking process.
PAC money frequently undermines representative government.2"
260. "Costs borne by others are called externalities. The failure to impose all the compo-
nents of cost on the decision maker often produces consequences deemed distressing and
objectionable - such as 'excessive' pollution and 'shortsighted' . . . laws." ALCHAIN &
MILLER, supra note 191, at 5 (emphasis in original).
261. Gerald E. Frug, Administrative Democracy, 40 U. TORONTO L.J. 559, 574 n.54 (1990).
262. Bureaucracies "unprecedented in size and power [are] regulating previously autono-
mous private interests, as well as dispensing benefits and subsidies to groups that formerly
had been assisted, if at all, by local government and private charities." ROBERT RABIN, PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1979).
263. Judge Posner, in his description of the interest group theory of legislation "asserts
that legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as other goods, so that legislative
protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall
social welfare ... ." Richard Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
264. HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON WORKS 263 (1988) (quoting a
former secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the president of
Common Cause).
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7. There is evidence that "[p]ublic expenditures are made for the
primary benefit of the middle classes, and financed with taxes which
are borne in considerable part by the poor and rich. ' 26 5 "The con-
stituencies that were supposed to have benefited from new bureau-
cratic and regulating programs - the poor and disadvantaged, envi-
ronmentalists, consumers, and workers' organizations - have found
the benefits delivered to be far below those promised."266
8. In Habermas's terminology, the lifeworld diminished by bu-
reaucratic encroachments provides disempowered citizens with little
personal control over their lives. The Supreme Court, unfortunately,
does not deplore bureaucratic techniques of domination 27 by
"[s]pecialists without spirit, sensualists without heart."2 68
9. The lingering ideology of positivism condones repressive and
exploitative administrative subsystems that are unresponsive to the
needs of the truly disadvantaged. 269 These administrative subsys-
tems often interfere with a person's identity formation and a dis-
crete and insular group's social integration.
7 0
10. A multitude of agencies responsive to special interests and un-
responsive to the truly, disadvantaged are largely uncontrollable by
society. "The legal commands adopted by. . . agencies are necessa-
rily crude, and dysfunctional in many applications ... .
11. When instrumentally rational agency officials do not engage in
reflective communicative action with their critics and clientele, the
very idea of the common good is emptied of real meaning.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Courts are no longer providing meaningful judicial review when
agency rules are challenged as arbitrary and capricious. 2  Judges
no longer presume that they have superior competence to interpret
265. GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER, Director's Law of Public Income Distribution, in CHICAGO
STUDIES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 106 (George Joseph Stigler ed., 1988).
266. Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990).
267. For an influential analysis of the tactics and techniques of pervasive power, see
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-
1977 (1980).
268. WEBER, supra note 133, at 182.
269. See PHILIPPE NoNET & PHILIP SELzmc, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW (1978).
270. See HABERMAS, supra note 139, at 362.
271. Stewart, supra note 266, at 343.
272. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts may hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions, findings, and conclusions found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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statutes limiting the power of agencies. According to Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,2 73 which
was followed in Rust, it is not the province and duty of courts to
"say what [administrative] law is."'274
In pre-Chevron days, a court reviewing agency action exercised
independent judgment to determine whether an agency is staying
within the boundaries of the field marked out by Congress. To a
large extent, post-Chevron cases allow agencies to lay down their
own boundary markers whenever the agency's enabling act is am-
biguous with respect to the precise issue of statutory authority.
Not only does the Court allow the fox to guard the henhouse, it
also does not allow lower court judges to order the agency to ad-
here to democratic procedures that will make administrative law
more responsive to persons adversely affected by proposed agency
rules. 5
To make administrative law more democratic, an "interest" rep-
resentation model of administrative law has been proposed 271 in or-
der to provide everyone with a better opportunity to participate in
agency rulemaking proceedings.211 The Supreme Court, however,
has rejected the model. The Court has also rejected the concept of
the legislative veto, which enabled Congress to supervise agencies
that run amuck.2 78 Administrative law is not sufficiently demo-
cratic, and rulemaking procedures do not allow the public to have
enough input. Moreover, the courts are not well-equipped to recon-
stitute administrative law on their own for many reasons, including
the following:
(1) The adversarial process encourages a zero sum game and liti-
gation forensics are inconsistent with discourse ethics. Indeed, the
format of adjudication denies many interested persons access to
courts.
273. 467 U.S. 837 (1984), reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
274. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
275. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
276. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1760-90 (1975).
277. This "democratic process ideal promotes the direct participation of the public
through such efforts as expanded right of involvement in agency and judicial review pro-
ceedings." Thomas A. Sargentich, The Future of Administrative Law, 104 HARv. L. REV.
769, 774 (1991) (book review); see Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 519, (disapproval of judge-
made improvements of agency procedures).
278. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidation of legislative veto).
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(2) Courts cannot adapt flexibly to rapidly changing social condi-
tions. Moreover, courts are backward looking rather than forward
looking; judges usually cannot make corrective changes once a final
judgment is entered.
(3) Courts, like agencies, are instrumentally rational subsystems
often steering society away from a consensus-based agreement con-
cerning normative rightness. In other words, courts prefer effi-
ciency279 and legalistic discourse rather than moral discourse.
280
Under the paradigm of positivism, normative rightness is deemed
beyond the parameters of the court's province and duty to review
agency rules.
(4) Scholarly checklists of interpretive "canons" (enabling courts
to construe regulatory statutes) are inadequate. 281
(5) The informed public's confidence in the ability of jurists,
judges, and "lawyers on their own to put right the major problems
in the legal system has collapsed. ' 28 2 Federal judges with life tenure
are increasingly divorced from the lifeworld.
Because of the inability of the courts to reconstitute administrative
law, the public has no choice but to turn to Congress.
Many concerned academic commentators believe the situation is
too urgent to delay radical reformation of the administrative pro-
cess.28 3 For example, Paul Brest writes, "we must design and carry
out programs of genuine participatory. . . spheres of human activ-
ity. Toward this end . . . we must abandon our obsession with
courts. . . 24 Brest concedes that "[p]articipatory democracy
has had few modern successes and many failures. But, if only be-
cause the alternative is so bleak, there is every reason . . . to work
to realize a genuinely participative deliberative democracy." 28 5
279. Richard Posner, A Theory of Primitive Society, With Special Reference to Law, in
CHICAGo STUDIES IN PoLrTCAL ECONOMY 149, 205 (George Joseph Stigler ed., 1988).
280. "Substantive administrative law issues tend to take a form such as "'Does the stat-
ute allow an agency to do X?' rather than, 'Is X a good or bad idea?"' Sargentich, supra
note 277, at 769.
281. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Jurisprudence: Canons Redux?, 79 CAL. L. REV.
807 (1991) (book review).
282. See Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARv. L. REV. 761, 769 (1987).
283. Frug, supra note 261, at 559 (1990); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism
After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 505 n.393 (1987); Stewart, supra note 266, at
335 (1990); Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REv. 86 (1986).
284. Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republican-
ism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623 (1988).
285. Id. at 1631 (footnotes omitted).
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A dialogue approximating discourse ethics would help people to
influence the subsystems that penetrate their lives and relation-
ships. Concededly, the conditions of discourse ethics are rarely in
place in the real world. Habermas's theory is adaptable, however,
and practicable procedures approximating the ideal can be devised
to realize more of the benefits of a participatory deliberative
democracy.
Consider, for example, the model conceived by Charles E.
Larmore, who discerns in the liberal conception of political neu-
trality a universal norm of rational dialogue. He writes:
When two people disagree about some specific point, but wish to
continue talking about the more general problem they wish to solve,
each should prescind from the beliefs that the other rejects, (1) in
order to construct an argument on the basis of his other beliefs that
will convince the other of the truth of the disputed belief, or (2) in
order to shift to another aspect of the problem, where the possibili-
ties of agreement seem greater. In the face of disagreement, those
who wish to continue the conversation should retreat to neutral
ground, with the hope either of resolving the dispute or of bypassing
it. Thus abstracting from a controversial belief does not imply that
one believes it any less, that one has had reason to become skeptical
toward it. One can remain as convinced of its truth as before, but for
the purposes of the conversation one sets it aside.2"'
According to Larmore's model, the government's "decisions cannot
be justified by an appeal to the intrinsic superiority of any. . . view
that remains disputed. '28
7
Compared to the models described by Habermas and Larmore,
the administrative process culminating in the Secretary's gag rule
falls far below acceptable levels of democratic discourse. Unfortu-
nately, agency rulemaking procedures rarely provide the kind of
"participation in the public sphere [that] . . . creates the founda-
tion for a genuine community."288 Rulemaking in a participatory
286. CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 53 (1987).
287. Id. at 54. Larmore's model, like Habermas's, is politically and morally neutral with
regard to controversial conceptions of the common good and the good life. Their models do
not eliminate irresolvable moral conflicts, but they guarantee an adequate discussion of the
morality of proposed rules.
288. Brest, supra note 284, at 1623. The cement of any community or society is composed
of varying amounts of altruism, envy, social norms, and self-interest. JON ELSTER, THE CE-
MENT OF SocimTy: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 287 (1989). The rules of the Secretary are
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democracy should, at a basic minimum, include realistic, workable
procedures that increase the influence of citizens affected by
agency rules. More controversial proposed procedures to reconsti-
tute administrative process include the following:
1. The composition of high-level administrative agency boards
should include, in addition to the executive branch's appointees, lay
persons who are elected or chosen by lot. The addition of ordinary
citizens to the composition of an agency is likely to expose several
agency board members to fresh ideas during their deliberations.
2. Government employees at all levels of bureaucracy should par-
ticipate meaningfully (orally, if practicable) in the debates, delibera-
tions, and final decisionmaking process of agencies. Obviously, not
all employees of large agencies can participate personally, but em-
ployees at all levels should have representatives who engage in dis-
course ethics with the officials having final rulemaking authority.
3. Before any rule becomes final, the rulemakers should appear at
a public hearing for questioning by affected members of the public.
Public support or opposition of rules should be determined by im-
partial pollsters whose data should be well publicized and made part
of the rulemaking record.
4. Rulemakers should be required to summarize their rules in tele-
vised appearances on a (C-Span-type) telephone call-in program.
5. All agency deliberations should be transcribed and videotaped.
The videotapes and transcripts should be preserved and mailed to
interested persons who request them, upon payment of a fee cover-
ing reasonable costs. For persons below certain income levels, fees
should be waived.
6. Procedures should be devised to inform members of the public
fully and frequently about the content of all written comments re-
ceived by the rulemaking agency, including any proposed amend-
ments. No empirical data or scientific studies should be withheld
from the public for more than 5 days during the rulemaking pro-
ceeding. Computer software programs can be designed to improve
communications between agencies and the public.
7. An office of ombudsman should be created with power to sub-
poena and publish documents that are not promptly disclosed by
the agency. Ombudsmen should have power to investigate the pub-
lic's complaints about agency action and inaction.
hardly altruistic in design for they are based on the self-interested political agenda of the
Reagan and Bush administrations.
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8. In addition to environmental impact statements and other im-
pact statements required by law, there should be a normative right-
ness statement justifying any proposed or final rule on grounds of
morality and social justice. All such statements should indicate how
the rules are responsive to human needs and aspirations.
9. Procedures for decentralizing controversial decisionmaking con-
cerning family life and family planning (by delegating power to state
and local governments, as well as to other relevant private organiza-
tions) should be institutionalized unless there are compelling coun-
tervailing reasons requiring centralized control.
10. Eligibility conditions for grants must never burden fundamen-
tal rights directly or indirectly unless the agency's well-documented,
reasoned explanation identifies how and why particularized compel-
ling interests are advanced by the most narrowly tailored, least bur-
densome, least discriminatory eligibility requirements.
11. If congressional intent is arguably unclear, the agency should
send its proposed rule and its proposed statutory construction to ap-
propriate committees in Congress whose members shall be invited to
comment on the rulemaking record.
12. If a rule is issued and upheld in court, whenever practicable, a
citizen's petition for redress of grievances should be considered in
congressional subcommittee hearings.
13. All proposals for greater public participation in rulemaking
should be docketed in a record open for public inspection. Whenever
possible, a brief reasoned statement explaining why any such propo-
sal was rejected should also be docketed.
14. Town meetings should be held, where appropriate, to discuss
proposals for reconstituting administrative law.
15. In order to generate greater public awareness and a more in-
formed public debate, legal scholars ought to make a greater effort
to educate the public about the need to curb agency power.
Habermas's theory of discourse ethics should be pertinent in this
scholarly effort.
16. Agencies should be required to publish in the Federal Register
a list of any rules that are being reviewed by the White House or the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Moreover, each federal
agency should be required to explain how any review by the White
House or OMB has affected their decision to draft a rule in a certain
way. Finally, the White House and OMB should be required to dis-
close to the media all documents pertaining to its review of an
[Vol. 26:87
RUST v. SULLIVAN
agency rule, as so long as privileged confidential information is not
disclosed.28
VII. CONCLUSION
Section I of this article examined an agency gag rule that is in-
compatible with the conditions necessary for discourse ethics. Al-
though Section II observed that legal theory rarely radically trans-
forms the law's institutionalized practices,
there is no atheoretical way to engage in the study of administrative
law. Most lawyers' allegiances to particular theories of the state are
unconscious, and therefore all the more potent in operation. By
functioning at the level of self-evident truths or tacit presupposition,
theory is placed beyond critical awareness and scrutiny.290
A theory like Habermas's discourse ethics must be translated
into public law through "moral leadership, which promotes social
cohesion and community and celebrates the freedom and individ-
ual dignity on which democracy depends."29 Absent effective po-
litical leadership which increases public participation in agency
rulemaking, the system's colonization of the lifeworld will continue
unabated. This is the unwelcome signal sent by Rust v. Sullivan.
Supporters of democratic government who find Habermas's
model of democracy superior to positivism are disheartened by
Rust. They deplore the Secretary's instrumentally rational regula-
tions, which require health care providers to surrender their First
Amendment freedoms. They rightfully condemn the Court's opin-
ion, which is insensitive to the interests of women. The opinion is
devoid of moral reasoning and therefore lacks the "legitimating
force [that results] from an alliance between law and morality. 2 92
Under progressive standards of democracy, the regulations upheld
in Rust were inadequately "exposed to discursive testing" for va-
lidity.2 3 Discursive testing asks the question, "Is the [regulation]
fair to others as well as myself, when I take into account everyone's
289. Dana Priest, Competitiveness Council Suspected of Unduly Influencing Regulators,
WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 1991, at A19, col. 1.
290. Allan C. Hutchinson, Mice Under a Chair: Democracy, Courts, and the Administra-
tive State, 40 U. TORO TO L.J. 374, 378 (1990).
291. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMocRAcY & PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEw AGE
238-39 (1984).
292. JORGEN HABERmAs, Law and Morality in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES
217, 219 (S. McMurrin ed. & K. Baynes trans. 1988).
293. Id. at 227.
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basic interests (generally described) and give them equal weight
with my own? ' '29 4 In short, discourse ethics condemns the proce-
dures leading to the Secretary's gag rule; it also condemns the sub-
stance of the Secretary's viewpoint selective rule and it exposes the
shallowness of the Supreme Court's commitment to freedom of
speech when the bureaucracy uses government funds to suppress a
point of view.
Discourse ethics is a morally superior alternative to the adminis-
trative and judicial procedures culminating in Rust v. Sullivan. In-
deed, Rust moves us away from "the institutional humanization of
the economy and the administrative state. ' 29 5 Rust v. Sullivan is a
shameful case ruling because it uncritically endorses undemocratic
rulemaking procedures that resulted in regulations abridging free-
dom of speech.2 96
APPENDIX A
The relevant provisions of the regulations upheld in Rust pro-
vide as follows:
§ 59.2 [Amended]
"Family planning" means the process of establishing objectives
for the number and spacing of one's children and selecting the
means by which those objectives may be achieved.... Family plan-
ning does not include pregnancy care (including obstetric or prena-
tal care). As required by section 1008 of the Act, abortion may not
be included as a method of family planning in the Title X project.
Family planning, as supported under this subpart, should reduce the
294. Lawrence Kohlberg et al., The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle and Moral Point of
View, in THE MoRAL DOMAIN 151, 167 (Thomas E. Wren ed., 1990) (quoting Paul W. Taylor,
On Taking the Moral Point of View, in 3 MIDWEST STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHIEs 35, 51 (Peter A.
French, et. al., 1978)).
295. See ROBERT N. BELLAH, RICHARD MADSEN, WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN SWEDLER,
STEVEN M. TinTON, THE GOOD Socmry 291 (1991) (discussing Habermas's works).
296. On November 19, 1991, the House of Representatives unsuccessfully attempted to
override President Bush's veto of a bill that would have nullified the gag rule upheld by the
Supreme Court. Many members of Congress explained that the gag rule does not violate
freedom of speech. Rust v. Sullivan was cited numerous times by politicians using the
Court's imprimatur for partisan purposes. Unfortunately, the Court's reasoning in Rust has
allowed the President to override the will of Congress. Unlike the Court, the majority of
American people realize that the gag rule violates the First Amendment, but the system
once again has failed to function properly and the poorest people continue to be poorly
served.
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incidence of abortion ...
"Title X" means Title X of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 300, et seq.
"Title X program" and "Title X project" are used interchangea-
bly and mean the identified program which is approved by the Sec-
retary for support under . . . the Act .... Title X project funds
include all funds allocated to the Title X program, including but not
limited to grant funds, grant-related income or matching funds.
§59.8 Prohibition on counseling and referral for abortion services;
limitation of program services to family planning.
(a) (1) a Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the
use of abortion as a method of family planning or provide referral
for abortion as a method of family planning.
(2) Because Title X funds are intended only for family planning,
once a client served by a Title X project is diagnosed as pregnant,
she must be referred for appropriate prenatal and/or social services
by furnishing a list of available providers that promote the welfare
of mother and unborn child. She must also be provided with infor-
mation necessary to protect the health of mother and unborn child
until such time as the referral appointment is kept. In cases in
which emergency care is required, however, the Title X project shall
be required only to refer the client immediately to an appropriate
provider of emergency medical services.
(3) A Title X project may not use prenatal, social service or emer-
gency medical or other referrals as an indirect means of encouraging
or promoting abortion as a method of family planning, such as by
weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care providers which
perform abortions, by including on the list of referral providers
health care providers whose principal business is the provision of
abortions, by excluding available providers who do not provide abor-
tions, or by "steering" clients to providers who offer abortion as a
method of family planning.
(4) Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as prohibiting the
provision of information to a project client which is medically neces-
sary to assess the risks and benefits of different methods of contra-
ception in the course of selecting a method; provided, that the pro-
vision of this information does not include counseling with respect
to or otherwise promote abortion as a method of family planning.
§ 59.9 Maintenance of program integrity.
A Title X project must be organized so that it is physically and
financially separate, as determined in accordance with the review es-
tablished in this section, from activities which are prohibited under
section 1008 of the Act and § 59.8 and § 59.10 of these regulations
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from inclusion in the Title X program. In order to be physically and
financially separate, a Title X project must have an objective integ-
rity and independence from prohibited activities. Mere bookkeeping
separation of Title X funds from other monies is not sufficient. The
Secretary will determine whether such objective integrity and inde-
pendence exist based on a review of facts and circumstances. Factors
relevant to this determination shall include (but are not limited to):
(a) The existence of separate accounting records;
(b) The degree of separation from facilities (e.g., treatment, con-
sultation, examination, and waiting rooms) in which prohibited ac-
tivities occur and the extent of such prohibited activities;
(c) The existence of separate personnel;
(d) The extent to which signs and other forms of identification of
the Title X project are present and signs and material promoting
abortion are absent.
§ 59.10 Prohibition on activities that encourage, promote or advo-
cate abortion.
(a) A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate
abortion as a method of family planning. This requirement prohibits
actions to assist women to obtain abortions or increase the availabil-
ity or accessibility of abortion for family planning purposes. Prohib-
ited actions include the use of Title X project funds for the
following:
(1) Lobbying for the passage of legislation to increase in any way
the availability of abortion as a method of family planning.
(2) Providing speakers to promote the use of abortion as a method
of family planning.
(3) Paying dues to any group that as a significant part of its activ-
ities advocates abortion as a method of family planning; (4) Using
legal action to make abortion available in any way as a method of
family planning; and
(5) Developing or disseminating materials (including printed mat-
ter and audiovisual materials) advocating abortion as a method of
family planning.
Section 59.10(b) provides, in relevant part:
59.10 Prohibition on activities that encourage, promote or advo-
cate abortion.
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(b) Examples. (1) Clients at a Title X project are given brochures
advertising an abortion clinic. Provision of the brochure violates
subparagraph (a) of this section.
(2) A Title X project makes an appointment for a pregnant client
with an abortion clinic. The Title X project has violated paragraph
(a) of this section.
(3) A Title X project pays dues to a state association which,
among other activities, lobbies at state and local levels for the pas-
sage of legislation to protect and expand the legal availability of
abortion as a method of family planning. The association spends a
significant amount of its annual budget on such activity. Payment of
dues to the association violates paragraph (a)(3) of this section.
(4) An organization conducts a number of activities, including op-
erating a Title X project. The organization uses non-project funds to
pay dues to an association which, among other activities, engages in
lobbying to protect and expand the legal availability of abortion as a
method of family planning. The association spends a significant
amount of its annual budget on each activity. Payment of dues to
the association by the organization does not violate paragraph (a) (3)
of this section.
(5) An organization that operates a Title X project engages in lob-
bying to increase the legal availability of abortion as a method of
family planning. The project itself engages in no such activities and
the facilities and funds of the project are kept separate from prohib-
ited activities. The project is not in violation of paragraph (a)(1) of
this section.
(6) Employees of a Title X project write their legislative repre-
sentatives in support of legislation seeking to expand the legal avail-
ability of abortion, using no project funds to do so. The Title X pro-
ject has not violated paragraph (a)(1) of this section.
(7) On her own time and at her own expense, a Title X project
employee speaks before a legislative body in support of abortion as a
method of family planning. The Title X project has not violated
paragraph (a) of this section.
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